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California's Prepaid Health Plan Program:
Can the Patient Be Saved?
By DAVID F. CHAVKIN* and ANNE TRESEDER**
In 1971 the state of California began encouraging the widespread
development of prepaid health plans' to meet the health needs of
Medi-Cal recipients.2 These plans would theoretically improve the
quality of health services available and at the same time reduce the
costs of such health care to the state. These dual goals would be real-
ized by encouraging the practice of preventive medicine, thereby re-
ducing the need for costly inpatient services.
This article reviews the development of the prepaid health plan
program in California beginning with the enactment of Medi-Cal in
1965. The Medi-Cal program restructured California's system of
health care for indigents and expanded both the number of persons
eligible and the scope of services available. One provision of this new
* B.S., 1968, Michigan State University; J.D., 1973, University of California
at Berkeley (Boalt Hall). Lecturer in Law, Golden Gate University School of Law;
Supervising Attorney, Litigation Unit, San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance
Foundation.
** B.A., 1966, Reed College; M.S., 1975, University of Wisconsin, Madison.
Health Consultant, San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation.
1. As used in this article, the term "prepaid group practice" refers to a medical
group which provides comprehensive health care services to a defined population in
exchange for prepayment on a per capita basis. Such an entity thus profits to the
extent that actual health care expenditures are less than capitation payments, but must
absorb the loss if the cost of medical services rendered exceeds income. This term
is often used interchangeably with the term "health maintenance organization" since
the emphasis in a prepaid group practice is theoretically on maintaining the health
of its patient community. See Ellwood, Health Maintenance Organizations: Concept
and Strategy, 45 HoserrAs 53-54 (1971).
The term "prepaid health plan" (PHP) refers to those prepaid group practices
which contract with the State of California to provide medical care for Medicaid re-
cipients in exchange for monthly capitation payments.
The delivery of Medicaid benefits through a PHP is to be distinguished from
the Medicaid "fee-for-service" model in which the amount of reimbursement paid by
the state to the provider of care is determined by the amount and type of service
actually rendered by the provider.
2. Medi-Cal is the name commonly used to refer to the California Medical
Assistance Program for indigents.
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legislation mandated the development of prepaid health plans to pro-
vide all health services to Medi-Cal recipients.
After more than a year elapsed without the actual development
of prepaid health plans, the California legislature authorized the imple-
mentation of pilot projects by the state to test various structures for pre-
payment. Limited pilot projects were conducted by the state over the
next few years.
During this period of experimentation with prepayment, costs
under the Medi-Cal fee-for-service program rose dramatically. Al-
though the actual magnitude of this cost increase was subject to widely
varying estimates, a fiscal crisis was precipitated within the state. The
Reagan administration, then in power in Sacramento, seized on the pre-
paid health plan (PHP) concept as a means of stemming these rising
costs. The establishment of PHPs on a large scale was included as
a major feature of the broad reform of the Medi-Cal program enacted
in 1971.
Major problems soon arose in the PHP program. Massive enroll-
ment fraud and poor quality services characterized the operations of
many plans. Numerous reports alleged widespread profiteering, con-
flict of interest, and mismanagement by plan administrators and by the
state agency responsible for supervision of the program. In 1972 the
California legislature enacted measures designed to curb many of these
abuses. When these initial controls proved inadequate the legislature
expanded and refined the governing legislation in largely futile at-
tempts to bring the program under control.
The advent of the Brown administration in 1975 renewed hopes
that existing PHP statutes and regulations would be vigorously enforced
and that new concepts would be developed. Those hopes have not
been realized, however. Administrative mismanagement, enrollment
fraud, poor quality care, and political favoritism have continued to
flourish.
The PHP program is indeed ailing. After reviewing the history
of the program in California, two questions must therefore be an-
swered. First, is the PHP program worth saving? Second, if it is worth
saving, what can and should be done to make the program viable?
The Enactment of Medi-Cal
The California Medical Assistance Program (Medi-Cal) was
signed into law on November 12, 1965, by then Governor Edmund G.
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Brown, Sr.3 This legislation implemented the recently enacted federal
Medicaid program4 in California.
Prior to the enactment of Medi-Cal, health services were provided
to California's indigents under a variety of state programs. The two
largest of these, Public Assistance Medical Care (PAMC)5 and Med-
ical Assistance for the Aged (MAA)6 provided health care to needy
children, the disabled, the aged, and the blind. The PAMC program
provided coverage primarily for outpatient service;7 the MAA program
provided inpatient services in hospitals and nursing homes for people
over 65.8 Both programs were enacted pursuant to federal enabling
legislation which provided federal money to match state expenditures. 9
3. Cal. Stat. 1965, 2d Ex. Sess., ch. 4, at 103.
4. Act of July 30, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 121, 79 Stat. 343.
Like the other federal grant-in-aid programs, matching funds are available under
the Medicaid program to those states which submit a plan in accordance with govern-
ing legislation. The federal government will pay between 50% and 83% of the total
amounts expended for medical assistance under the state plan. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396b(a)
(1), 1396d(b) (Supp. V, 1975). Federal financial participation is also available to
defray some of the state's administrative costs. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396b(a) (2)-(6) (Supp.
V, 1975).
Medical assistance may be extended to individuals receiving aid to families with
dependent children (AFDC) and supplemental security income. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a
(a) (10) (A) (Supp. V, 1975). Needy children and their caretaker relatives are eligible
for AFDC if they are deprived of parental support or care by reason of death, continued
absence, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent or parents or by reason of
the unemployment of the father. 42 U.S.C. §§ 606(a), 607 (1970). Individuals are
eligible for supplemental security income (SSI) if they are aged, blind, or disabled.
42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1385 (1970). At the time the Medicaid program was enacted,
aged, blind, and disabled individuals received assistance under state programs funded
through federal grants-in-aid similar to the AFDC program. On January 1, 1974,
the administration of those state programs was taken over by the federal government
through the Social Security Administration. Individuals applying for AFDC and SSI
must also meet certain criteria for income and resources.
Medical assistance may also be extended under state plans to "categorically-related
medically needy" individuals. These individuals are said to be categorically-related
because they are related to one of the categories of public assistance by age, blindness,
disability, or deprivation of parental support or care. These individuals have either
chosen not to apply for financial assistance or have excess income or resources. 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (10) (C) (Supp. V, 1975).
5. Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 1068, §§ 1-11, at 2345-53, (repealed 1965).
6. Cal. Stat. 1961, ch. 1227, §§ 1-8, at 2967-74 (repealed 1965).
7. Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 1068, § 1, at 2346 (repealed 1965).
8. Cal. Stat. 1961, ch. 1227, § 1, at 2970 (repealed 1965).
9. Act of Aug. 1, 1956, ch. 924 § 301, 70 Stat. 807, 846; Social Security Amend-
ments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-778, § 601, 74 Stat. 924, 987.
California's indigents who were ineligible for PAMC or MAA remained largely
dependent on the county hospitals for health care. Cal. Stat. 1937, ch. 464, § 1,
at 1406, as amended, CAL. WELF. & INSr'NS CODE § 17000 (West 1972).
For an excellent discussion of the provision of health care services to indigents
in California prior to the enactment of Medi-Cal, see M. GREENFrELD, MEni-CAL,
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Assembly Bill 5, the Medi-Cal bill, was enacted during an Extra-
ordinary Session of the California legislature convened on September
20, 1965.10 Despite concern expressed by some legislators over pos-
sible costs of the program,1 the legislation was passed overwhelmingly
by both the senate and the assembly.
12
Several sections of A.B. 5 became effective immediately as an ur-
gency measure; most of the provisions took effect on March 1, 1966.1'
Much of the impetus for the rapid enactment of the Medi-Cal program
was fiscal-the increased availability of federal matching funds.' 4
Assembly Bill 5 repealed both the PAMC and MAA programs."
In their place, a single program was established for both outpatient and
inpatient services, 16 while at the same time, both the number of indi-
viduals eligible17 and the scope of services provided' s were greatly in-
THE CALIFORNIA MEDICAID PROGRAM (TITLE XIX) 1966-67, App. A, at 61-65 [herein-
after cited as GREENFIELD].
10. For a discussion of the legislative process involved in the passage of A.B.
5, see GREENFIELD, supra note 9, at 10.
11. Id. at 11.
12. A.B. 5 was passed in the Senate by a vote of thirty to three. SENATE DAILY
JOURNAL, 1965 2d Ex. Sess., Nov. 3, 1965, at 193. Later the same day the Assembly
concurred in the Senate amendments by a vote of sixty-one to one. ASSEMBLY DAILY
JOURNAL, 1965 2d Ex. Sess. Nov. 3, 1965, at 372.
13. Cal. Stat. 1965, 2d Ex. Sess., ch. 4, § 12, at 132.
14. The costs to the state which would be occasioned by delay in implementing
a state Medicaid program were repeatedly stressed to legislators. During the 1964-
65 fiscal year, for example, PANIC and MAA costs totaled $20 million per month.
The federal share of these costs amounted to less than $8 million per month. If
a Medicaid program had been in effect federal matching funds would have paid 50%
of the total costs. GREENFIELD, supra note 9, at 10.
15. Cal. Stat. 1965, 2d Ex. Sess., ch. 4, §§ 1, 3, at 103, 125.
16. Id., §§ 2, 4, at 103, 125.
17. Health care and related remedial or preventive services were to be provided
to residents of the state who were: (1) recipients of public assistance, or (2) medi-
cally indigent adults or families whose income and resources were insufficient to meet
the costs of health care. Cal. Stat. 1965, 2d Ex. Sess., ch. 4, § 2, at 105 (now
CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 14005, 14005.1, 14005.7 (West 1972 & Supp. 1976)).
In addition, within the limits of available funds, health care was to be extended
to the following categories of recipients in decreasing order of priority: (1) individuals
and families who would be eligible for public assistance but for otherwise applicable
durational residence requirements; (2) individuals and families whose income and re-
sources were comparable to those on public assistarice; (3) individuals and families
whose income and resources were comparable to the MAA standards in effect in Decem-
ber 1965; and (4) individuals and families whose income and resources were com-
parable to the standards for aid to the blind in effect in December 1965. Cal. Stat.
1965, 2d Ex. Sess., ch. 4, § 2, at 107 (repealed 1968).
Until January 1, 1967, however, eligibility was to be limited to those individuals
and families who would have been eligible for medical assistance under state programs
in effect during December 1965. Cal. Stat. 1965, 2d Ex. Sess., ch. 4, § 2, at 104,
as amended, CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 14000 (West 1972 & Supp. 1976).
18. Health care services were defined to include: (1) inpatient services, (2)
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creased. As the legislature declared:
The intent of the Legislature is to provide, to the extent practicable,
through the provisions of this chapter, for basic health care for
those aged and other persons, including family persons who lack
sufficient annual income to meet the costs of health care, and
whose other assets are so limited that their application toward the
costs of such care would jeopardize the person or family's future
minimum self-maintenance and security. 19
After the passage of A.B. 5, Governor Brown stated:
Of all the factors which create and sustain poverty among our peo-
ple, poor health is one of the most nagging and pervasive. With
this bill, we can offer to the poor services which will help prevent
illness and medical care which will cure illness in a consistent, com-
prehensive fashion, which recognizes the individual's need for total
medical care.
20
Governor Brown went on to caution, however, that the legislation pro-
posed "no new structures to meet the previously unmet need of poor
and low income Californians for quality, comprehensive care."' 1
The Advent of Prepayment
Despite Governor Brown's disclaimer, the stage was in fact set for
an experiment in the provision of health services to indigents through
new structures-prepaid health plans. Section 2 of A.B. 5 provided
that, "After December 31, 1966, [health care under Medi-Cal] shall,
outpatient services, (3) laboratory and x-ray services, (4) skilled nursing home services
for recipients under the age of 21, (5) physician services, (6) medical care or any
other type of remedial care recognized under the laws of the state, (7) home health
care services, (8) private duty nursing services, (9) outpatient clinic services, (10)
dental services, (11) physical therapy and related services, (12) prescribed drugs, den-
tures, prosthetic devices, and eyeglasses, (13) other diagnostic, screening, preventive,
or rehabilitative services, and (14) inpatient hospital and skilled nursing home services
for individuals 65 years of age or older in an institution for tuberculosis or mental
disease. Cal. Stat. 1965, 2d Ex. Sess., ch. 4, § 2, at 110-11, as amended, CAL. WELF.
& INsnNS CODE § 14053 (West Supp. 1976).
At a minimum, the services outlined in paragraphs (1)-(5) were to be provided.
Other services listed were also to be provided depending on the availability of funds
and on the effect that such additional services would have in preventing or reducing
the likelihood of future high cost medical services. Cal. Stat. 1965, 2d Ex. Sess.,
ch. 4, § 2, at 115, as amended, CAL. WurF. & INsr'NS CODE § 14056, 14105 (West
Supp. 1976).
19. Cal. Stat. 1965, 2d Ex. Sess., ch. 4, § 2, at 103.
20. Sacramento Bee, Nov. 4, 1965, at Al, col. 18, A6, col. 2.
21. Id.
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to the extent feasible, be provided through a system of prepaid health
care or contracts with carriers.
'22
To assist the Health and Welfare Agency in fulfilling this statutory
mandate, the legislature authorized the promulgation of standards to
determine the income of persons not receiving public assistance. This
averaging of income would facilitate the establishment of rates of pay-
ment to PHPs by the state and by those Medi-Cal recipients who had
to contribute to their health care. 3
Pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 14104, the
Health and Welfare Agency was authorized to contract with carriers to
provide health benefit plans. 24  These "carriers" were defined to in-
clude group arrangements with private insurance companies, medical
societies or other medical groups, associations of insurers, nonprofit
hospital service plans, nonprofit membership corporations, or other
plans authorized under state law.
2 5
The administrator of the Health and Welfare Agency was also
authorized to notify eligible Medi-Cal beneficiaries of the availability
of such health benefit plans and the benefits provided thereunder..2 1
At the same time, the Health Review and Program Council27 was to
study the provision of health services under such plans with emphasis
on the costs of such plans and the quality of care provided.28
These provisions of A.B. 5 were not the first step in the develop-
ment of prepayment in California, however. In 1917, the state legis-
lature passed and submitted to the voters a constitutional amendment
which would have established a program of health insurance
22. Cal. Stat. 1965, 2d Ex. Sess., ch. 4, § 2, at 104.
23. Those Medi-Cal recipients who do not receive financial assistance from the
state and who have income above a specified maintenance need level must contribute
to their costs of health care. Cal. Stat. 1965, 2d Ex. Sess., ch. 4, § 2, at 106 (now
CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 14005.7-05.12 (West 1972)). The maintenance need
level is similar to the deductible in a private insurance policy and is known as the
Medi-Cal liability.
24. Cal. Stat, 1965, 2d Ex. Sess., ch. 4, § 2, at 113 (repealed 1972).
25. Id. at 112.
26. Id. at 117.
27. The Health Review and Program Council was established by Cal. Stat. 1965,
2d Ex. Sess., ch. 4, § 2, at 118 (now CAL. WELF. & INsT'NS CODE §§ 14125.1-126
(West 1972 & Supp. 1976)). The purposes of the council included improving the
quality of care, providing planning assistance to the Health and Welfare Agency, and
grading the performance of health insurance prepayment plans. Id.
The council was renamed the California Health Care Commission in 1971. Cal.
Stat. 1971, ch. 577, § 37.7, at 1127.
28. Cal. Stat. 1965, 2d Ex. Sess., ch. 4, § 2, at 117-18 (now CAL. WELF. &
INST'NS CODE § 14126 (West 1972)).
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for those persons whose incomes were insufficient to meet the costs
of illness.29 This amendment was the result of a proposal by a state
commission created in 1915 by Governor Hiram Johnson for the study
of social insurance." The amendment was overwhelmingly rejected
in the November 1917 general election.
By 1965 a number of private prepayment plans were already in
operation in California. In 1929 Drs. Ross and Loos established the
state's first prepaid group practice, the Ross-Loos Health Plan and con-
tracted to provide care to the employees of the Los Angeles Water De-
partment. 31
In 1933 an independent doctor established a health plan which
was later taken over by the Kaiser Industrial Organization to provide
comprehensive care for its construction workers and their families in
the Mojave Desert.32  The Kaiser Foundation Health Plan opened its
membership to the general public after World War H and became the
first prepaid group practice to be implemented on a large scale.33
In the 1957 Regular Session, the California legislature enacted the
PAMC program.34 Section 1 of that act provided:
[T]he State Department of Social Welfare may contract for one
or more indemnity or service-type partial or full prepayment or
group payment programs to provide medical care or any aspect
thereof, with any [qualified] agency or organization . . .5
This provision was also contained in the 1961 legislation enacting the
36MAA program.
29. This amendment provided: "It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
State of California to make special provision for the health and welfare and the support
during illness of any and all persons, and their dependents, whose incomes, in the
determination of the legislature, are not sufficient to meet the hazards of sickness
and disability, and for the general industrial welfare in this connection. The legislature
may establish a health insurance system applicable to any or all such persons, and
for the financial support of such system may provide for contributions, either voluntary
or compulsory, from each of the following, namely, from such persons, from employers,
and from the state by appropriations." Cal. Stat. 1917, Sen. Const. Amend. No. 26,
ch. 57 at 1948.
30. GREENFIELD, supra note 9, at 16.
31. The development of the Ross-Loos Medical Group is discussed in A. Kisch
& A. Ziseltear, The Ross-Loos Medical Group, June 1967 (Public Health Service, U.S.
Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare.)
32. The development of the Kaiser Foundation Health Plan is discussed in A.
SoMms, ThE KAISER-PERmANETE MEDicAL CARE PRooAfM: A SyMPOsIuM 17 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as SoMERS].
33. Id. at 18.
34. Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 1068, § 1-11, at 2345-53 (repealed 1965).
35. Id. § 1, at 2348.
36. Cal. Stat. 1961, ch. 1227, § 1, at 2969 (repealed 1965).
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Beginning in 1963, California Physicians' Services (Blue Shield)
contracted on behalf of the Santa Barbara Medical Society with the
County of Santa Barbara for the delivery of medical services to PAMC
and MAA recipients on a capitation basis.37 An evaluation of this pro-
ject for the California Office of Health Care Services, 38 however, re-
vealed that the program did not vary significantly from the fee-for-ser-
vice PAMC programs in neighboring counties.8 9
Under the Santa Barbara Plan, California Physicians' Services
provided administrative services on a no-profit, no-loss basis.40 No
party, it appeared, was responsible for providing services if costs ex-
ceeded capitation payments, a result inconsistent with the concept of
prepayment.4 ' The study reported that costs, especially administrative
costs, were probably higher under this program than under the fee-
for-service equivalents in adjoining counties.42 The report concluded
that while "the concept of prepayment is not totally without merit...
[t]he Santa Barbara experience revealed the problems of putting this
theory into practice.
'43
Thus, by the time that A.B. 5 was enacted, during the Second Ex-
traordinary Session of 1965, 4 little had been done to experiment with
37. W. Canterbury, A Review of the Santa Barbara 'Prepaid Plan', Exhibit A,
California Physicians' Service "Prepaid Plan" Contract with Santa Barbara County,
Sept. 1967 (prepared at the request of the Division of Planning, Cal. Office of Health
Care Services and on file at the Interdepartmental Library, Health and Welfare Agency,
Sacramento, California) [hereinafter cited as Canterbury].
38. Initial responsibility for administering the Medicaid program in California
was assigned to the Health and Welfare Agency. Within this agency an Office of
Health Care Services was developed to supervise the program. This office was later
renamed the Department of Health Care Services. Effective on July 1, 1973, the
health programs in the state were consolidated under the administration of the Depart-
ment of Health of the Health and Welfare Agency. For a history of the struggle
over which agency would have responsibility for administering the Medi-Cal program,
see GREENFIELD, supra note 9, at 12-14, 24-30.
39. Canterbury, supra note 37, at 2.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 4.
42. Id. at 5.
43. Id.
44. Legislation had been proposed earlier in the year. In the 1965 regular ses-
sion, Assemblyman Casey introduced A.B. 760. ASSEMBLY DAILY JOURNAL, 1965 Reg.
Sess., Feb. 2, 1965, at 422. This legislation became the vehicle for an attempted revision
of the entire program of health care for indigents.
Section 2 of A.B. 760 would have established a program of medical assistance
for aged and other persons, including family groups, without sufficient income to meet
the costs of health care. This section also provided: "After June 30, 1966, such
care shall, to the extent feasible, be provided through a system of prepaid health care
benefits." A.B. 760, as amended, ASSEMBLY DAILY JOURNAL, 1965 Reg. Sess., May
24, 1965, at 3872.
When the 1965 regular session closed, however, no final action had been taken
the delivery of services to indigents through PHPs. Furthermore, the
little experience that was available suggested a less than optimistic
prognosis for the practicability of such plans. Despite those facts, the
Health and Welfare Agency45 had been mandated by the legislature
to provide health care under Medi-Cal through a system of PHPs to
the maximum extent feasible after December 31, 1966.46
The Pilot Projects
December 31, 1966, came and went without implementation of
a PHP program.47 To reemphasize the intent of A.B. 5 that prepaid
health care was to be the system for the delivery of health services,
the legislature enacted amendments to the Medi-Cal program during
the foliowing year.
48
The amendments, embodied in A.B. 1140, remandated the Health
and Welfare Agency to begin experimenting "to the extent feasible"
with prepaid health plans. 49  In addition, Welfare and Institutions
Code section 14000(e) was added to provide that PHP contracts with
carriers could be for any number of enumerated health services and
on A.B. 760. FINAL CALENDAR OF LEGISLATIVE BUSINESS, ASSEMBLY FINAL HISTORY,
1965 Reg. Sess., at 264. The measure was thereafter reintroduced as A.B. 2 during
the first extraordinary session of 1965. ASSEMBLY DAILY JOURNAL, 1965 1st Ex. Sess.,
June 25, 1965, at 9. This special session had been called by Governor Brown to
enact legislation establishing a new program for public assistance medical care. Id.
at 2-3. Despite the fact that Congress had as yet failed to enact the Medicaid program,
there was fear that during the delay after congressional passage, large amounts of
federal funds might be lost. GREENFIELD, supra note 9, at 15. Provisions relating
to prepayment in A.B. 2 were nearly identical to those contained in A.B. 760. Compare
A.B. 760, as amended, SENATE DAILY JOURNAL, 1965 Reg. Sess., June 13, 1965, at
3834, with A.B. 2, as amended, ASSEMBLY DAILY JOURNAL, 1965 1st Ex. Sess., June
29, 1965, at 47-48.
As passage of the federal Medicaid program dragged on, the legislature again
deferred consideration of the proposed large-scale revision of state medical assistance
programs, and the first extraordinary session closed without enactment of A.B. 2. FINAL
CALENDAR OF LEGISLATIVE BusINEss, ASSEMBLY FINAL HISTORY, 1965, 1st Ex. Sess.,
at 9. On July 30, 1965, President Johnson signed the Social Security Amendments
into law, establishing the Medicaid program. Act of July 30, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-
97, § 121, 79 Stat. 343. Slightly more than three months later, during the second
extraordinary session, the California Medi-Cal program was finally established, with
the passage of A.B. 5. ASsEmBLY DAILY JOURNAL, 2d Ex. Sess., Nov. 3, 1965, at
372.
45. The Health and Welfare Agency had been created to fulfill the federal require-
ment that a single state agency be responsible for the administration of the medicaid
program within the state. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (5) (Supp. V, 1975).
46. Cal. Stat. 1965, 2d Ex. Sess., ch. 4, § 2, at 104.
47. Cal. Stat. 1965, 2d Ex. Sess., ch. 4, § 2, at 104.
48. Cal. Stat. 1967, ch. 1702, §§ 1-3, at 4261-63.
49. Id. § 1, at 4261.
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could establish coverage "on the basis of the class of recipient, class
of benefit, geographical area, or any other reasonable classification." 50
Finally, one of the amendments directed that the programs to be estab-
lished provide services as efficiently as possible, utilize "different meth-
ods of providing health care services," emphasize methods for prevent-
ative care and review, and "provide incentives for using the most eco-
nomical level of care." 1
The first pilot project in prepayment was established on February
1, 1968, by a contract between the Department of Health Care Services
and the San Joaquin Foundation for Medical Care.5 2 The Foundation
is a wholly owned corporation of the San Joaquin County Medical So-
ciety. 3 Under the San Joaquin project, a Medi-Cal recipient main-
tained freedom of choice in selecting providers as required by state
and federal law. 54  Recipients in the four counties covered by the
San Joaquin project could continue to see the provider of their choice,
whether or not the provider was a member of the Foundation.
The objective of the pilot project was to test the cost control po-
tential of a medical care foundation managing a limited prepayment
program for Medi-Cal recipients. The contract initially provided for
coverage of physician services only.55
The pilot project originally involved 22,000 recipients of aid to the
blind, aid to the disabled, and aid to families with dependent children
in Amador, Calaveras, San Joaquin, and Tuolumne Counties.56 The
Foundation was paid a monthly capitation payment or premium by the
state for all qualifying residents in the four-county area." In the initial
contract period, for example, the Foundation received $6.25 per month
for each recipient of aid to families with dependent children.58 This
50. Id. at 4262 (now codified as CAL. WELF. & INsT'NS CODE § 14000(f) (West
1972)).
51. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 14000(f) (West 1972).
52. CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE LEG-
ISLATURE ON MEDI-CAL PILOT PROJECTS, Attachment 1, at 1 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as 1969 PILOT PROJECT REPORT].
53. D. Harrington, System of Medi-Cal Administration and Health Care Delivery
Based Upon the Individual Practice System 2 (prepared for discussion at the 1970
National Health Forum) [hereinafter cited as Harrington].
54. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23) (Supp. V, 1975); CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE
1 14105 (West Supp. 1976).
55. 1969 PILOT PROJECT REPORT, supra note 52, Attachment 1, at 1.
56. Id.
57. Id., Attachment 3, at 2.
58. CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE LEG-
ISLATURE ON MEDI-CAL PILOT PROJECTs 20 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1970 PILOT
PROJECT REPORT].
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capitation rate compared to a statewide monthly average of $6.35 for
physician services reimbursed by the state on a fee-for-service basis
during the following year.59 Generally, the premium rates were com-
parable to the statewide costs for the same types of covered services. 60
Under the renewed contract effective on August 1, 1970, capitation
payments to the Foundation were 10 percent below the statewide fee-
for-service average for the previous year.6 1 The department concluded
in 1971 that the pilot project had shown "a significant improvement
in the control of costs of physician services" while maintaining a high
quality of care.6
The main cost control device used by the Foundation was peer
review. Peer review was established as a means for identifying and
controlling the insufficient, excessive, or inappropriate use of medical
services and for monitoring fees charged by providers.63 The Founda-
tion found that peer review could control costs in three ways. First,
the prospect of review could deter the provision of unnecessary services
or the billing of improper charges. Second, upon actual review, many
charges could be disallowed or reduced before payment. Finally, the
peer review process could help to educate the provider in proper pro-
cedures.
6 4
In practice, the Foundation physician completed a claim form each
time he or she treated a Foundation patient. From this claim form
the Foundation assembled profiles of the services received by each pa-
tient and the services provided by each physician.65 These treatment
profiles were then reviewed by claims examiners to discover improper
treatment patterns.66
Claims examiners evaluated all claims against criteria established
for the most frequently seen conditions by the Quality and Cost Review
Committee of the Foundation. 7  Those claims that did not meet the
59. Id.
60. Special Hearing on Prepaid Health Care Plans Before the Assembly Comm.
on Health, 1971 Reg. Sess., Mar. 1, 1971, at 4 [hereinafter cited as 1971 Health Comm.
Hearings].
61. 1970 PILOT PROJ-Cr REPORT, supra note 58, at 20.
62. 1971 Health Comm. Hearings, supra note 60, at 5.
63. See Harrington, supra note 53, at 4.
64. 1970 PILOT PRoJECr REPORT, supra note 58, at 15.
65. See Harrington, supra note 53, at 4.
66. Id.
67. Foundation for Medical Care, San Joaquin Medical Society, Progress in Pre-
payment: A Summary of the Pilot Project Designed to Deliver Quality Medical Care
to the Poor, at 4, June 1969. Criteria are organized based on diagnosis. For example,
diagnosis and treatment of hypertension without mention of heart disease based upon
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criteria, approximately 20 percent, were sent to a reviewing physi-
cian.6
8
The reviewing physician examined the claim against the frame-
work of the provider and patient profiles. Further information might
have been requested from the provider. If the reviewing physician felt
the extra services were justified, the payment was approved. If the
physician did not approve payment in full, the claim was referred to
the Quality and Cost Review Committee.6
Approximately 2 percent of all claims ended up in the Quality and
Cost Review Committee. The Review Committee reviewed the claim
and could request the provider to appear before it. If the claim was
disallowed in whole or in part by the committee, further review was
available by appeal to the California Medical Association. No appeals
were ever made.
70
Extensive peer review should discourage excess provision of ser-
vices, 71 and therefore act as a cost control device. 72  Unfortunately,
however, such review may not be nearly as successful in uncovering
the more serious problem of underutilization. This factor would be-
come crucial when the San Joaquin model was used outside the pilot
project setting in widespread Medi-Cal programs.
The second pilot project was instituted on September 1, 1969,
more than one elevated blood pressure reading would be evaluated against the following
criteria: "Visits, Office only. Frequency, Initial diagnostic work-up plus one or two
visits during the first week. No more than once a month thereafter, except in severe
cases, then 2 to 3 times a month. Lab & X-Ray, Urinalysis, CBC, EKG, chest
x-ray, renal function tests (NPN, PSP, IVP, concentration tests, etc.), fluoroscopy per-
missible. Serum electrolytes. Therapy, Sedatives, tranquilizers, and anti-hypertensives.
Duration, Chronic." Id. at 6.
68. Harrington, supra note 53, at 4.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 4-5.
71. For example, one study showed that hospital days per one hundred benefi-
ciaries in the Foundation were approximately 27% less than the number of hospital
days per one hundred patients in a comparison group of fee-for-service Medi-Cal pa-
tients. See F. Gartside, Medicaid Services in California Under Different Organizational
Modes: The Utilization and Costs of Services in the San Joaquin Prepayment Project
36, January 1971 (study published by the School of Public Health, University of Cali-
fornia, Los Angeles). Comparison was made between utilization of hospital services
by AFDC recipients under the San Joaquin Plan and under the fee-for-service system
in Ventura County. Ventura County was chosen by the researchers because, in their
opinion, "[almong [California] counties without a medical foundation, Ventura was
closest to the four-county complex of the San Joaquin Plan in the combined factors
of size of population, percentage of the labor force in agriculture, household income,
and population ratios of hospital beds and physicians." Id. at 9.
72. Harrington, supra note 53, at 4.
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with the Family Health Program of Southern California, a medical
group practice.78 The objective of this project was to test the cost
control potential as well as recipient acceptance of a prepaid group
practice.7 4  The Family Health Program Pilot Project varied signif-
icantly from the San Joaquin Foundation in that Medi-Cal recipients
were not automatically enrolled in the plan.7 1 The Family Health Pro-
gram thus had the burden of persuading eligible Medi-Cal recipients
within its geographical area to join.70
Participants were limited to those receiving aid to families with
dependent children and old age security. By November 1, 1970,
nearly 5,000 individuals, 90 percent of whom were recipients of aid
to families with dependent children, had enrolled in the plan.77  These
recipients lived in the Long Beach area of Los Angeles. 8
Services available to Medi-Cal enrollees in the Family Health Pro-
gram were comparable to those available under fee-for-service Medi-
Cal. There were certain exclusions, however.79  As a means of at-
tracting Medi-Cal eligibles to join the Family Health Program, two
types of services that were not generally provided under Medi-Cal fee-
for-service were promised to recipients. Transportation was available
without charge by Family Health Program bus to all Medi-Cal enrollees
for the purpose of keeping medical appointments at Family Health Pro-
gram clinics. 80 Child care also was furnished. 81
73. 1969 PILOT PRo3-F.cT REPORT, supra note 52, Attachment 1, at 1.
74. Id.
75. Under the San Joaquin Foundation Pilot Project, the Foundation received
a set amount each month based on the number of Medi-Cal eligibles in the four counties
served. From this amount the Foundation had to pay for all covered services received
by the Medi-Cal recipients whether through a Foundation doctor or not. Id.
76. Id. Under the San Joaquin Project a Medi-Cal recipient maintained freedom
of choice in selecting providers as required by state and federal law. See text accom-
panying notes 52-72 supra. Under the Family Health Program, however, a recipient
could only be treated by providers who were members of the Family Health Program.
See 1970 PILOT PROrCT REPORT, supra note 58, at 32. Limitation of the recipient's
freedom of choice therefore required some affirmative act by the recipient. That affirm-
ative act was enrollment in the plan.
77. 1970 PILoT PRoJECr REmoRT, supra note 58, at 31.
78. Id.
79. The most significant limitation was the denial of payment to unauthorized
nonplan providers. See id. at 32. The plan could thereby control the number and
type of services that would be provided to enrollees. This was a significant cost control
measure and would be included in nonpilot PHP contracts of the department. Failure
by enrollers to explain this limitation to potential recipients would be cited as one




Under the Family Health Program, member physicians were sal-
aried;82 as a result, there was no financial incentive for overutilization
of services by the provider."3 However, since the plan physician
would receive the same amount of money regardless of the number and
type of services provided, there was a temptation for those physicians
to promote minimal utilization of plan services.
The 1971 Special Hearings of the Assembly Health Committee on
Prepaid Health Plans addressed the potential problem of underutiliza-
tion. Dr. Robert Gumbiner, Executive Director of the Family Health
Program, testified that "enemies of group practice prepayment" say
that "if you have a direct service prepayment the provider may take
the money and not deliver the care, or deliver care of poor quality." 4
Dr. Gumbiner contended, however, that if the plan does not provide
good care in the early stages of disease, it will be forced to provide
more expensive services when the patient becomes seriously ill.85 In
addition, the dissatisfied patient would complain to the Department
of Health Care Services.
86
At least in theory, Dr. Gumbiner seemed correct. A prepaid
health plan would profit by substituting less costly preventive medicine
and ambulatory care for the expensive inpatient hospital services.
Moreover, if the Department of Health Care Services received numer-
ous complaints from enrollees about limited and poor quality services,
the contract between the state and the plan would surely not be re-
newed.
Unfortunately Dr. Gumbiner's comments failed to take several
factors into account. First, a large number of the dissatisfied recipi-
ents might well disenroll from the plan soon after experiencing diffi-
culties in obtaining services. Thus the plan, no longer responsible for
the care of these patients, would never have to provide the hospital ser-
vices that would later be needed. The costs of correcting the failure
of the plan to treat the patient during the early stages of disease would
82. Gumbiner, Doctors Can Do Well With Capitation Payments, MED. ECON.,
Nov. 9, 1970, at 150.
83. Gumbiner, Alternatives for the Provision of Health Services through the
Present Medi-Cal Program, Feb. 26, 1971, at 2 (on file at San Francisco Neighborhood
Legal Assistance Foundation).
84. 1971 Health Comm. Hearings, supra note 60, at 37-38.
85. Id. at 38.
86. Id. The department also put forward several mechanisms for control of the
potential problem of underutilization. These included disenrollment by the Medi-Cal
beneficiary, peer review, comparison by the state of the number of services given to
Medi-Cal patients to services provided private patients by the same group practice
and comparison with other prepaid plans, comparison of prepaid services to fee-for-
service recipient averages, and medical audits by the state. Id. at 12-15.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28
then be borne not by the prepaid health plan but by the Medi-Cal fee-
for-service program. In addition, plan accountability would rest in
large part on the watchful monitoring and vigorous enforcement of con-
tractual, regulatory, and statutory requirements by the Department of
Health Care Services. The failure of the department to fulfill these
responsibilities would become all too apparent in the years ahead.
Numerous other pilot projects in prepayment were tested.1
7
Generally the pilot projects were established with existing entities in
the health field. The usefulness of these pilot projects was often
greatly diminished by the lack of standards for review by the depart-
ment,8 but by 1971 the department had concluded that "prepaid com-
prehensive health care represents a feasible alternative to the Medi-
Cal program."' 9 However valid this conclusion may have been, the de-
partment did not begin to foresee the problems that would arise in
translating the results of the pilot projects to the operational stages of
the PHP program.
Fiscal Crisis in the Medi-Cal Program
In fiscal year 1964-65, the last year before implementation of the
Medi-Cal program, federal, state, and county expenditures for medical
87. The pilot projects included one to test the potential of cost control and im-
provement of utilization practices through preventive dentistry on a prepayment basis,
as well as several other projects to demonstrate the cost savings of providing medical
care for beneficiaries under a prepayment program. 1970 PILOT PROJECT REPORT,
supra note 58, at 36. See also CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF HEALTH, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE
GOvERNOR AND LEGSLATRtmE ON PILOT PROGRAMS 2 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974
PILOT PROJECT REPORT]; CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES, 1972 ANNUAL
REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND TO THE LEGISLATURE 2 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1972
PILOT PROJECT REPORT]; CALIFoRNIA DEP'T OF HEALTH CARE SERvIcEs, ANNUAL REPORT
TO THE LEGISLATURE ON MEDI-CAL PILOT PROJECTs 17 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1971
PILOT PRoJEcT REPORT]; 1971 Health Comm. Hearings, supra note 60.
88. Criteria to evaluate pilot projects were not even developed until late in 1970.
Moreover, the standards that emerged were so general as to be of little use in evaluat-
ing the success or failure of the projects. Six criteria were put forward. (1) There
must be some basis for cost comparison either with a control group or with statewide
trends. (2) Quality of care must be measured. The department cautioned that this
was especially important in the small prepaid group practice where services might be
improperly limited in order to avoid costs. (3) The pilot project should demonstrate
increasing acceptance by providers as measured by increased participation. (4) The
pilot project should demonstrate increasing acceptance by beneficiaries. This could
be demonstrated through consultation with consumer advisory committees within the
project. (5) The project should have a positive effect on the delivery of services.
This might be indicated by an increase in drug usage as a result of reduced injections
in physicians' offices. (6) The project should also have a beneficial effect on the
delivery of services to non-Medi-Cal recipients through, for example, the extension
of peer review from Medi-Cal enrollees to private patients. 1970 PILOT PROJECT RE-
PORT, supra note 58, at 5-12.
89. 1971 Health Comm. Hearings, supra note 60, at 16.
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care under the PAMC and MAA programs were $186,394,000.90 In
fiscal year 1965-66, 91 these costs increased to $408,953,000.2 By fis-
cal year 1966-67, the first full year under the Medi-Cal program,
total medical care expenditures under the program increased to
$709,700,000.9
3
In November 1966, the administrator of the Health and Welfare
Agency, Paul Ward, told Governor-elect Ronald Reagan that the Medi-
Cal program would run a deficit of $81.6 million by the end of the fiscal
year unless benefits were reduced or appropriations were increased.
94
By December 4, 1966, the Office of Health Care Services had revised
its estimated expenditures downward significantly from $709 million to
$614 million.95 This new estimate reduced the likelihood of a deficit
for fiscal year 1966-67. Although some of the urgency for a solution
to spiralling Medi-Cal costs had passed, the problem still remained.
On January 19, 1967, the new administrator of the Health and
Welfare Agency, Spencer Williams, announced steps by which the ad-
ministration would save $30 million of federal and state monies in the
Medi-Cal program. 96 These steps included deferring all elective pro-
cedures until the following fiscal year and controlling the amount of
hospitalization.
97
The governor's budget, submitted to the legislature on January 31,
1967, projected Medi-Cal program expenditures of $619.4 million for
the 1967-68 fiscal year.98 More problems soon arose, however, with
projected costs for the 1966-67 fiscal year.99
90. See SENATE SOCIAL WELFARE SUBCOMM. OF GENERAL RESEARCH OF THE SEN-
ATE SOCIAL WELFARE COMM., 1969 Reg. Sess., A STUDY OF WELFARE EXPENDITURES,
APPENDIX TO THE JOURNAL OF THE SENATE, Vol. 1, at 131 [hereinafter cited as 1969
SENATE STUDY].
91. The PAMC and MAA programs were terminated on February 28, 1966. Cal.
Stat. 1965, 2d Ex. Sess., ch. 4, §§ 1, 3, at 103, 125. The Medi-Cal program was
initiated on March 1, 1966. Cal. Stat. 1965, 2d Ex. Sess., ch. 4, § 12, at 132.
92. See 1969 SENATE STUDY, supra note 90, at 132.
93. Id. at 131. Between fiscal years 1964-65 and 1966-67, the state share alone
of administrative and medical expenditures increased from $55,767,000 to $225,200,000.
Id. at 132.
94. GREENFIELD, supra note 9, at 53. The 1966-67 appropriation for the Medi-
Cal program had been set at approximately $620 million for health services and adminis-
trative costs.
95. Id.
96. Health and Welfare Agency Press Release, Jan. 19, 1967, at 1.
97. Id.
98. CAL. SUPPORT AND LOCAL ASSISTANCE BUDGET FOR THE FISCAL YEAR JULY
1, 1967 TO JUNE 30, 1968, at 956.
99. The first problem was whether the state costs of the county option were
to be included in the per capita ceiling on expenditures. The county option allowed
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On July 19, 1967, Administrator Williams announced to the
Health Review and Program Council that the deficit for the 1966-67
fiscal year might be as high as $150 million.10 Williams explained
that an emergency session of the council might be necessary to develop
plans for reducing this deficit. 10' On July 25, 1967, new estimates
were released by the Health and Welfare Agency which projected that
Medi-Cal expenditures for the 1966-67 fiscal year would exceed alloca-
tions by almost $130 million." 2 This deficit would have to be carried
over into the 1967-68 fiscal year. 0 3 In addition, revenues had been
overestimated for the 1967-68 fiscal year.10 4 As a result, the total
Medi-Cal deficit for 1967-68 was now estimated at $210 million.'03
On August 16, 1967, the Health and Welfare Agency announced
a series of program changes designed to bring the Medi-Cal program
into fiscal balance.' These changes reduced the scope of services
available and eliminated many services altogether. 10 7  The cuts in serv-
California counties to select a different' method of sharing with the state the costs
of providing medical care for individuals not eligible for Medi-Cal benefits. Coun-
ties selecting the option could shift the costs to the state to the extent that the costs
exceeded the counties' 1964-65 expenditures after adjusting for population growth. Cal.
Stat. 1965, 2d Ex. Sess., ch. 4, § 2, at 121 (repealed 1971). Passage of the option
had helped to solidify county support for the Medi-Cal programs. See GREENFMLD,
supra note 9, at 10-11.
The statute provided that state and county expenditures for the Medi-Cal program
could not exceed $18.25 per recipient per month. Cal. Stat. 1965, 2d Ex. Sess., ch.
4, § 2, at 119. The second problem concerned the opinion of the attorney general
that accrual accounting was required for the Medi-Cal program.
Legislation provided a temporary solution to both problems. On February 16,
1967, Assemblymen Veneman, Duffy, and Chappie introduced A.B. 583. As finally
enacted, this bill removed the cost of the county option from the Medi-Cal per capita
ceiling, and set certain limitatiojis on state contributions for county expenditures. Cal.
Stat. 1967, ch. 104, § 2, at 1016 (repealed 1971).
The accrual accounting problem was solved by S.B. 1065. This bill provided for
a modified accrual system which incorporated the dollar value of claims on hand as
of June 30, 1967, but removed the requirement that services rendered but not yet
billed be included. The bill also placed a ceiling of $305 million from state sources
for the 1967-68 fiscal year and removed the $18.25 limitation for the 1966-67 fiscal
year. Cal. Stat. 1967, ch. 1421, § 1, at 3342 (repealed 1971).
100. Health and Welfare Agency Press Release, July 19, 1967, at 1.
101. Id.
102. GREENFMLD, supra note 9, at 55.
103. Since this estimate was made prior to the passage of S.B. 1065, the Health
and Welfare Agency administrator had anticipated satisfying the 1965-66 deficit out
of the 1967-68 appropriation. Regarding S.B. 1065, see note 99 supra.
104. GREENFmLD, supra note 9, at 55.
105. Id.
106. Health and Welfare Agency Press Release, Aug. 16, 1967. See also GREEN-
FIELD, supra note 9, at 56.
107. Surgical procedures for nonemergency or non-ife-threatening conditions were
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ices were widely condemned by professional organizations, community
groups, and Democratic legislators."0 8 On August 28, 1967, a tempo-
rary restraining order was issued by Judge Irving Perluss in a lawsuit
filed by California Rural Legal Assistance, a legal services program
funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity, on behalf of affected
Medi-Cal recipients throughout the state.0 9 The order in Morris v.
Williams enjoined the Reagan administration from implementing the
proposed cutbacks in services." 0
After further briefing and oral argument, Judge Perluss ruled that
the curtailment in the scope of services violated state law which re-
quired proportionate reductions in all services rather than elimination
of any services entirely."' Only the limitation on private hospitaliza-
tion to eight days was upheld.1
2
On September 12, 1967, Williams announced that an appeal
would be filed and that "pending a final determination by the Appellate
Courts, bills for services beyond those authorized by the regulations
may not be paid.""' 3  On November 20, 1967, the California Supreme
Court affirmed the decision of the trial court."' The court concluded
that the service cutbacks violated "the mandatory requirements of
[Welfare and Institutions Code] sections 14006.5 and 14105 by re-
stricting physicians' services for recipients of public assistance without
eliminating the medically indigent from the Medi-Cal program." 1 5
no longer covered. Health and Welfare Agency Press Release, Aug. 16, 1967, at 2.
Outpatient psychiatric services in physicians' offices were no longer provided. Routine
foot care, hearing examinations, restorative dentistry and several other services previ-
ously provided were also eliminated. In addition, physicians' fees were rolled back
to the January 1, 1967, "usual and customary" level. Id. at 2-3.
108. GREENFIELD, supra note 9, at 57.
109. Morris v. Williams, No. 177968 (Sacramento, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Aug.
28, 1967). Medical, dental, and pharmaceutical groups joined in the action as amicus
curiae in support of the California Rural Legal Assistance position.
110. Id.
111. At the August 11, 1967 meeting of the Health Review and Program Council,
Administrator Williams had stated to the council members that the staff of the Office
of Health Care Services had found unfeasible the legislative mandate that services
be curtailed proportionately. GREENFIELD, supra note 9, at 56.
112. Morris v. Williams, No. 177968 (Sacramento, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Aug.
27, 1967).
113. Health and Welfare Agency Press Release, Sept. 12, 1967, at 1.
114. Morris v. Williams, 67 Cal. 2d 733, 433 P.2d 697, 63 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1967).
The appeal had been filed with the California Court of Appeal for the Third District.
Upon the request of the parties, and in view of the importance and urgency of the
matters involved, the case was transferred to the California Supreme Court. Id. at
738, n.3, 433 P.2d at 700, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 692.
115. Id. at 761, 433 P.2d at 716, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 708. Welfare and Institutions
Code section 14006.5 provided: ". . . If sufficient funds are not available to provide
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The court also concluded that the service cutbacks violated section
14103.7 (of the Welfare and Institutions Code) "by eliminating cer-
tain services entirely in the absence of a showing that proportionate
reductions were not 'feasible' to some extent.""16
Governor Reagan was severely critical of the Morris decision.'
1 7
On November 21, 1967, the governor placed the question of Medi-Cal
reform before the legislature during the Second Extraordinary Session
of 1967.118 During that session two important measures were passed.
The first measure, S.B. 7, introduced by Assemblyman Burgener,
shortened the allowable period for submission of bills from six to two
months after service was rendered." 9 The second measure, introduced
by Assemblyman Veneman, called for a moratorium on Medi-Cal cut-
backs and appropriated funds for an audit to ascertain the extent of
purported deficits in the program. 20
On December 14, 1967, the Health and Welfare Agency an-
nounced that the estimated deficit for the 1967-68 fiscal year had been
revised downward from $210 million to $35.5 million.' 21 On January
health care for all of the persons enumerated in this section, the director shall reduce
services in accordance with the priorities set forth in this section and in accordance
with the provisions of Section 1902(a)-(14) of the Federal Social Security Act." Cal.
Stat. 1965, 2d Ex. Sess., ch. 4, § 2, at 107 (repealed 1968). Section 14105 authorized
the administrator to promulgate regulations not inconsistent with governing state law.
CAL. WELF. & INsT'NS CoDE § 14105 (West 1972).
116. 67 Cal. 2d at 761, 433 P.2d at 716, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 708. Welfare and
Institutions Code section 14103.7 provided: 'The Administrator . . . when reducing
services under this chapter . . . in order to maintain the program within the fiscal
limits fixed by the Legislature, shall, to the extent feasible, make proportionate reduc-
tions in all services, rather than eliminating any service or services entirely." Cal.
Stat. 1967, ch. 1421, § 1, at 3342 (repealed 1968) (now CAL. WELF. & INST'Ns CoDn
§ 14120(c) (West Supp. 1976)).
117. Reagan stated that the decision required the state to eliminate 160,000 mostly
aged indigents from the Medi-Cal program and declared that the court, "which has
substituted its policy views for those of our medical experts, must now bear the burden
for disruption of the Medi-Cal program." Office of the Governor, Press Release, Nov.
20, 1967, at 1.
118. ASSEMBLY DAmY JOURNAL, 1967 2d Ex. Sess., Nov. 21, 1967, at 123. Gov-
ernor Reagan continued his criticism of the court's decision: 'The ruling went beyond
the traditional concept of separation of powers .... The court has disrupted the
Medi-Cal program and seriously jeopardized needed medical treatment for many Cali-
fornians .... Now the legislature has the chance to say to the Supreme Court: 'Get
out of our store. We are running our own shop."' Office of the Governor, Press
Release, Nov. 21, 1967, at 2.
119. CAL. WELF. &INST'NS CoDE § 14115 (West 1972).
120. Cal. Stat. 1967, 2d Ex. Sess., ch. 15, at 78.
121. Health and Welfare Agency Press Release, Dec. 14, 1967, at 1. The factors
leading to this downward revision were listed in the release. First, the passage of
S.B. 1065 made available $53 million for 1967-68 Medi-Cal costs. Second, an actuarial
study initiated by the California Hospital Association reduced the estimated deficit
January 19771
4, 1968, state Director of Finance, Gordon P. Smith, announced that
enough money was available to operate the Medi-Cal program at the
present level without any major cutbacks in services or in recipient
rolls."'2 Smith further announced that the overexpenditure for services
rendered prior to July 1, 1967, had been paid out of 1966-67 appro-
priations.1' 3
A report by the bipartisan Joint Legislative Committee on Medi-
Cal Administration confirmed Smith's conclusions. 124  The committee
found that instead of a fiscal shortage, the Medi-Cal account would
show a surplus for the 1967-68 fiscal year.'25 The committee con-
cluded that "[t]here are no financial reasons to reduce Medi-Cal bene-
fits below current standards in either 1967-1968 or 1968-1969."126
Actual total expenditures for Medi-Cal decreased from the previ-
ous year's $805 million to $706 million for the 1967-68 fiscal year.1
2 7
During the 1968-69 fiscal year, however, actual expenditures turned
upward again to $940 million. 128  Expenditures during the 1969-70 fis-
cal year increased to $1.119 billion.' 29 Projected expenditures for the
1970-71 fiscal year were set at $1.25 billion.'3 0
In August, 1970, eligibility levels for medically needy individuals
were raised to include more people within the program.' 3' In Sep-
by an additional $27 million. Another $27 million was saved by eliminating certain
funds that were originally projected to meet new nursing home standards. Tighter
nursing home utilization controls saved $7 million. The eight day limitation on private
hospitalization reduced the projection by $15 million. Finally, a rollback of physicians
fees was expected to save $10 million. Id. at 1-2. $35.5 million of the remaining
$71 million deficit would be paid by the federal government under the 50% matching
formula, leaving a net deficit for the state of $35.5 million. See note 4 supra. Regard-
ing S.B. 1065, see note 99 supra.
122. Department of Finance Press Release, Jan. 4, 1968, at 1.
123. Id.
124. JOINT COMMITTEE ON MEDI-CAL ADMINISTRATION, 1968 REG. SEss., REPORT
(1968).
125. Id. at 19.
126. Id. at 20. For a further description of the events during this period, see
R. STEVENS & R. STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA: A CASE STUDY OF MEDI-
CAID (1974).
127. CALIFORNIA LEGIsLATIVE ANALYST, CALIFORNIA MEDICAL AssisTANCE PRO-
GRAM, BACKGROUND INFORMATION, Table 3, at 4 (1971). Part of this reduction was
due to the uncertainty engendered by the warning of Administrator Williams after
the trial court decision in Morris v. Williams that bills would not be paid by the
state if the appeal to the supreme court was successful. See text accompanying note





131. Id. at 13.
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tember, 1970, the scope of benefits for the medically needy was ex-
panded to be commensurate with the benefits provided to public as-
sistance recipients.'8 2 These changes added to the spiralling increase
in costs for the Medi-Cal program. By December 1970, a $200 million
deficit was projected for the Medi-Cal program.'8s
On December 11, 1970, with a certain sense of d6ja vu, Dr. Earl
Brian, Director of the Department of Health Care Services, announced
the promulgation of emergency regulations to deal with a projected
$140 million deficit in the Medi-Cal program for the 1970-71 fiscal
year.13 4  These emergency regulations, effective December 15, 1970,
provided for a cut of 10 percent in physicians' fees and in fees to most
other providers. 135 Prior authorization was required for some drugs
and price ceilings were placed on others.' 36 Certification was required
for all hospitalization, even in emergencies.'l s
On January 13, 1971, a lawsuit was filed by the California Medical
Association against the state seeking to prevent enforcement of the
emergency regulations. 38 On June 1, 1971, after a lengthy trial,
Judge William M. Gallagher of the Sacramento County Superior Court
ruled that Director Brian had failed to establish that an emergency ex-
isted.' 39  These latest cutbacks had therefore been implemented with-
out statutory authorization and were invalid.'4
Although an "emergency" had been judged not to exist, costs con-
tinued to increase dramatically. Both the legislative and executive
branches searched for a solution.' 41 In early 1971, the Reagan admin-
istration announced its answer.
132. Id. at 14.
133. Office of the Governor, Press Release, Dec. 2, 1970, at 1.
134. Finding of Emergency Order Amending Regulations of Department of Health
Care Services, Dec. 11, 1970, at 1. This finding of emergency estimated a deficit
of $140 million for the 1970-71 fiscal year.
135. Id.
136. Id. "Prior authorization" required a provider to receive approval by a de-
partment consultant before providing specified services. If prior authorization was not
granted, reimbursement would not be provided for the service by the state.
137. Id.
138. California Medical Ass'n v. Brian, No. 208390 (Sacramento, Cal. Super. Ct.,
filed Jan. 13, 1971). California Rural Legal Assistance intervened in this action, and
numerous medical, dental and pharmaceutical groups appeared as amicus curiae.
139. Id.
140. Id. The decision of the trial court was affirmed by the court of appeal
in California Medical Ass'n v. Brian, 30 Cal. App. 3d 637, 106 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1973).
141. Increasingly, the solutions proposed relied on the concept of prepaid health
care. In 1968, the Assembly Committee on Public Health issued a report on the
Medi-Cal program with several recommendations for change. One of the recommenda-
tions was for the development of prepaid contracts for comprehensive health care serv-
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The Medi-Cal Reform Act
Governor Reagan outlined his proposal for reform of the Medi-Cal
program in his state of the state message to a joint session of the Cal-
ifornia State Legislature. 4"
[D]rastic reform is demanded in Medi-Cal.
In its first year of operation, Medi-Cal began exceeding esti-
mated costs when only a third of those eligible had discovered its
magic basket of goodies. Five years ago one out of fifteen Califor-
nians was on Medi-Cal-today one out of nine is enjoying with few
inhibitions on use a program of unlimited coverage providing two
to three times the services of health programs the working man can
afford for himself and his family ...
• . . Hastily enacted under a federal whip, five years of operation
have made it plain that Medi-Cal cannot meet California's needs.
During this session we will present for your consideration a
plan to limit our health care services to the poor so they will be
comparable with the health benefits provided by the various pre-
paid health insurance plans covering most of our citizens. 143
This proposal was expanded in the Message from the Governor
transmitted to the legislature on March 3, 1971. The Governor's mes-
sage described the basic operation of PHPs and proposed to stimulate
the development of qualified PHPs and to finance the enrollment of el-
igible welfare recipients through capitation payments. 144 In addition to
ices. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON PUBLIC HEALTH, A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON MEDI-CAL,
1968 Reg. Sess. 24 (1968). The committee pointed out that "if there is validity to
the premise that having responsibility for providing health care services within a fixed
monthly amount per person will significantly reduce costs, especially through reduced
hospital utilization, then the cost per recipient should be less for the same amount
of protection." Id. at 26 (citations omitted).
Support for the prepayment concept as a means of controlling Medicaid costs
was also building on a national level. In 1970 an HEW task force endorsed the
development of health maintenance organizations as an option for Medicare and Medi-
caid beneficiaries. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, & WELFARE, REPORT OF THE
TASK FORCE ON MEDICAID AND RLATF PROGRAMS 33 (1970). The report concluded.
"The Health Maintenance Organization proposal constitutes an important step toward
possible long-range improvements in the organization and delivery of health services.
It would encourage the Nation's physicians, hospitals, and other health institutions
to seek out optimum ways of providing adequate services while striving to control
unnecessary utilization." Id. at 33-34.
142. ASSEMBLY DAILY JOURNAL, 1971 Reg. Sess., Jan. 12, 1971, at 137.
143. Id. at 144-45.
144. ASSEMBLY DAILY JOURNAL, 1971 Reg. Sess., Mar. 3, 1971, at 699, 825. On
February 18, 1971, President Nixon transmitted a similar message to the United States
Congress, calling for legislation to promote the development of health maintenance
organizations to serve Medicare patients and other federal beneficiaries. 117 CONG.
REc. 3015-21 (1971).
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prepayment, Governor Reagan also proposed institution of copayment
by Medi-Cal recipients' 45 and authorization controls for those services
requested by recipients beyond a specified basic schedule of bene-
fits.146
On March 15, 1971, A.B. 949 was introduced by Assemblyman
William Campbell. 47  This bill embodied the proposals outlined by
Governor Reagan. After lengthy negotiations between the administra-
tion representatives and legislators, 4 " A.B. 949 was passed by both
houses of the Legislature. 49  On August 13, 1971, it was signed into
145. ASSEMBLY DAiLY JouRAL, 1971 Reg. Sess., Mar. 3, 1971, at 822. Under
the copayment plan, Medi-Cal recipients would be required to contribute to the cost
of health services as a means of discouraging utilization. Copayment was analogized
to the deductible required in most health insurance plans. Id. at 822-24.
146. Id. at 820. The basic schedule of benefits would include, for example, two
outpatient visits per month and two prescriptions per month. Under the governor's
proposal, recipients who required more than two outpatient visits or more than two
prescriptions in a particular month would receive such services through supplemental
care organizations at the county level under state supervision. Id. at 820-22.
147. ASSEMBLY DAILY JOURNAL, 1971 Reg. Sess., Mar. 15, 1971, at 1080.
148. The negotiation process for the Medi-Cal Reform Act and the companion
Welfare Reform Act is described in Tough Trading Breaks Executive-Legislative Dead-
lock on Welfare and Medi-Cal, 2 CAL. J. 193 (1971).
149. A.B. 949 was passed by the Assembly on July 22, 1971. ASSEMBLY DAmY
JouRNAL, 1971 Reg. Sess., July 22, 1971, at 7463. The Senate approved the bill, with
amendments, on August 11, 1971. SENATE DAILy JoURNAL, 1971 Reg. Sess., Aug.
11, 1971, at 6140. Assembly concurrence in the Senate amendments was voted the
following day. ASSEMBLY DAILY JoURNAL, 1971 Reg. Sess., Aug. 12, 1971, at 8345.
Numerous other measures to revise the Medi-Cal program and reduce costs had
been proposed during the same period. S.B. 1271 was introduced at the request of
the California Medical Association. SENATE DAILY JOURNAL, 1971 Reg. Sess., Apr.
14, 1971, at 1016. See also CMA Bill Seeks to Divorce Medi-Cal From Politics,
CMA NEws, May 25, 1971, at 3; 1971 Health Comm. Hearings, supra note 60, at
87-98 (testimony of Dr. Marvin Shapiro). This legislation would have replaced the
Department of Health Care Services with a public corporation which would contract
annually with the legislature for the provision of health services to Medi-Cal benefi-
ciaries.
The following day, Assemblyman Henry Waxman introduced A.B. 2719. ASsEm-
BLY DAILY JoUmNAL, 1971 Reg. Sess., Apr. 15, 1971, at 1831. This legislation would
have established minimum physician-patient staffing ratios for prepaid health plans
serving Medi-Cal recipients. The legislation would also have required all facilities
and personnel used by plans to be licensed. All but emergency surgery would have
had to be performed by qualified specialists, and health plans would have been required
to assign one managing physician to each enrollee to supervise and coordinate the
enrollee's health care. A.B. 2719, as submitted, Apr. 15, 1971, at 3-4.
Centralized recordkeeping, internal medical audits, and continuing education for
plan medical personnel, would have been required. Standards would also have been
established for enrollment, and for consumer participation in plan decisionmaking. Id.
at 3-7.
The Reagan administration, however, opposed the passage of the Waxman bill.
Provisions requiring a public hearing before the execution of a PHP contract, for exam-
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law as an urgency measure. 1510
As enacted, A.B. 949 maintained the Governor's strong emphasis
on PHPs as a means of reducing Medi-Cal costs. Studies were to be
undertaken to determine the most cost-effective system for delivering
health care, and this system was to be implemented throughout the
state.151 Plans were required to insure that health care services were
readily available to beneficiaries' 52 and to pay for emergency services
rendered outside of the plan's contract area. 53  In addition, A.B. 949
established data reporting responsibilities for PHP contractors and di-
rected contractors to allow state access to plan records for the purpose
of verifying these reports.'54 Capitation rates were to be reasonably
consistent with, and potentially less than, the cost of providing such
services to comparable beneficiaries in the same area under the Medi-Cal
fee-for-service program.155 A.B. 949 authorized the Department of
Health Care Services to provide information to Medi-Cal beneficiaries
on the availability and coverage of PHPs. 56 The Health Care Commis-
sion'" was to study the quality of care under Medi-Cal, including the
provision of services by PHPs. 58
The Medi-Cal Reform Act (A.B. 949) made several other changes
that affected the development of the prepaid health program. The di-
rector of the Department of Health Care Services was given discretion
to require prior authorization before particular services could be provided
pie, were opposed by Dr. Earl Brian, the Reagan administration's secretary of health
and welfare, as being "administratively cumbersome." According to Dr. Brian,
"[S]omebody got ideology mixed up with desires in the health care business, resulting
in wanting to involve beneficiaries in going through various procedures. Rather than
promoting prepaid capitation they have indeed placed a stumbling block in front of
it." Deposition of Earl Brian, June 11, 1971, at 11, King v. Brian, No. 203130,
(Sacramento, Cal. Super. Ct., filed June 24, 1970).
Largely because of the administration's opposition, the Waxman bill died in the
Assembly without reaching a vote. FINAL CALENDAR OF LEGISLATIVE BUSINESS, ASSEM-
BLY FINAL HIsTORY, 1971 Reg. Sess., at 868. The proposed legislation would reappear,
however, in expanded form one year later as the Waxman-Duffy Prepaid Health Plan
Act. See Cal. Stat. 1972, ch. 1366, at 2718. See text accompanying notes 239-57 infra.
150. Cal. Stat. 1971, ch. 577, §§ 1-56, at 1107.
151. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 14000(f) (West 1972).




156. Id., § 34.4, at 1124.
157. Article 4 of the act renamed the Health Review and Program Council as
the Health Care Commission. Id., § 37.7, at 1127 (repealed 1973). It also redefined
the organization's membership and responsibilities. CAL. WE.F. & INST'NS CODE 9H
14125.1-126 (West 1972 & Supp. 1976).
158. Cal. Stat. 1971, ch. 577, § 34.4, at 1124 (repealed 1972).
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to recipients.159 Copayment was established for many recipients with
charges of $1.00 for each outpatient visit and $.50 for each prescribed
drug. 60 In contrast to the many restrictions on services imposed by the
Medi-Cal Reform Act, coverage was extended for the first time to non-
categorically related medically indigent adults. 61
Since Medi-Cal recipients maintained their freedom of choice in
selecting health care providers under the new legislation, 62 some
method had to be used to encourage providers and recipients to partici-
pate in the PHP program. This method was characterized by the Rea-
gan administration as "the carrot and the stick."'16 The administration
acknowledged that while "the State has eschewed coercion, it has im-
plemented a definite philosophy.' 164  The "stick" in this system was
represented by the additional requirements of prior authorization and
copayment. As well as being restrictive and bothersome to patients,
these new procedures would increase the red tape and bureaucratic an-
noyances for physicians seeking rapid reimbursement. 65 Recipients
would be encouraged to enroll in Pils by the promise of unlimited
services (theoretically not subject to prior authorization) and by the
fact that PUP clinics did not require copayment by recipients. 6 6 Pro-
viders would be encouraged to participate through the promise of as-
sured and prompt capitation payments.' 67
The "carrot and the stick" approach to encouraging provider and
recipient participation was linked to a theory of "minimal regulation"
for encouraging the formation of plans. As described by the depart-
ment:
The program operates without undue governmental interference in
the practice of medicine and other healing arts. The State's role
159. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 14103.6 (West 1972 & Supp. 1976).
160. Cal. Stat. 1971, ch. 577, § 38, at 1130 (repealed 1974). The institution
of copayment in California required a waiver of the requirements of 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a) (14) (B) (1970). The granting of this waiver by the secretary of HEW was
unsuccessfully challenged in California Welfare Rights Organization v. Richardson, 348
F. Supp. 491 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
161. CAL. WEF. & INST'NS CODE § 14005.6 (West 1972 & Supp. 1976).
162. Id. § 14005 (West 1972).
163. Cal. Dep't of Health, Prepaid Health Plans: The California Experience, June
9, 1974, contained as Exhibit No. 30 in Hearings on Prepaid Health Plans Before
the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Gov't Operations,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 236 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Jackson Committee Hearings].
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. See also Fairbanks, Medi-Cal: Seeking a Cure for Unbearable Costs, 6
CAL. J. 40, 41 (1975).
167. Fairbanks, Medi-Cal. Seeking a Cure for Unbearable Costs, 6 CAL. J. 40, 41
(1975).
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is limited to safeguarding its interests and those of its beneficiaries,
without the constriction of unnecessary anticipatory regulations.
168
This laissez faire philosophy was expressed in the first set of regu-
lations adopted by the department in the fall of 1971.169 Generally,
these regulations simply incorporated the provisions of the Medi-Cal
Reform Act. Several additional requirements were imposed by the
regulations, however. PHPs were required to have the financial re-
sources and the administrative and organizational capabilities sufficient
to carry out their contractual obligations. 7 ° Plans were also required
to demonstrate the availability and accessibility of an adequate number
of facilities and personnel.' 7 ' Proposals for PHP contracts were to in-
clude information regarding the proposed health care delivery sys-
tem, 7 2 plan finances, 73 the administrative organization of the plan,'
7 4
the plan's system for internal performance monitoring,175 and such ad-
ditional information as the department might require. 176 No standards
were established, however, to guide the department in considering
these proposals.
77
The regulations also provided that enrollments must be volun-
tary, 78 and that enrollment contracts would be for a minimum period
of one year,179 with each plan restricted to enrolling Medi-Cal benefici-
aries residing within its geographical boundaries. 80  The minimum en-
rollment period was to be clearly stated on the enrollment form signed
by the recipient.' 8'
The regulations required that beneficiaries be provided with writ-
ten information about the plans available to them.8 2 All written in-
formation prepared by the PUP was subject to prior approval by the
department. 8 3  Disenrollment was deemed mandatory when the en-
168. Cal. Dep't of Health, Prepaid Health Plans: The California Experience, June
9, 1974, in Jackson Committee Hearings, supra note 163, at 234.
169. CAL. ADMIN. REG. 71, No. 40 (repealed 1973).
170. 22 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 51600(a) (3), (4) (repealed 1973).
171. Id. § 51600(a)(5).
172. Id. § 51602(g).
173. Id. § 51602(h).
174. Id. § 51602(i).
175. Id. § 51602(j).
176. Id. § 51602(k).
177. See id. § 51604.
178. Id. § 51606(a).
179. Id. § 51606(b).
180. Id. § 51606(c).
181. Id. § 51606(e).
182. Id. § 51606(d).
183. Id.
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rollee moved outside the geographical area covered by the PEP or be-
came ineligible for Medi-Cal benefits.184 The enrollee could also
terminate at any time after having been enrolled in the plan for the
minimum period. 8 5 Disenrollment in other circumstances would only
be approved when the director of the Department of Health Care Serv-
ices determined that reasonable cause was present. 180 The regulations
provided that contracts could be terminated or capitation payments
withheld whenever the plan failed to comply with all the appropriate
laws, regulations, or terms of the contract or for other good cause. 1
The first nonpilot P-P contract, with Innovative Health Systems,
became effective on April 1, 1972.188 A contract, effective May 1,
1972, was signed with the Central Los Angeles Health Project.18 9 By
December 1972, twenty-two PEP contracts were in effect. 9°  The
184. Id. § 51608(a).
185. Id. § 51608(b).
186. Id. § 51608(c).
187. Id. § 51612.
188. 1972 PnOT PROJECT REPORT, supra note 87, at Table I. Other materials
published by the Department of Health Care Services do not list this contract. See
CAL. DEP'T OF HEALThI, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE ON PREPAID HEALTH
PLANs (PHPs) 2 (June 1974). The Innovative Health Systems contract, which lapsed
on January 1, 1973, was the conversion of a preexisting pilot project contract. 1972
PILOT PROJECr REPORT, supra note 87, at 7.
189. 1972 PILOT PRoJEcr REPORT, supra note 87, at Table I.
190. Id.
During 1972, standards were established for evaluating proposals for PHP contracts.
Cal. Dep't of Health Care Services, Evaluation and Monitoring of Prepaid Health Plans
(1972). Prospective PHPs were expected to cover ten areas in their initial proposals
to the state: the general purpose of the proposal, the legal capacity under which the
carrier intended to contract, the service area to be covered, the number of proposed
enrollees for the first contract year, proposed premiums, design of health delivery capa-
bilities, a certified statement of existing assets and liabilities, a proposed budget, the
proposed system of internal performance monitoring, and information regarding the
proposed providers. Id. at 3-4.
Plans were to include a roster of all key administrative and professional medical
personnel involved in the plan and brief resumes. Copies of all subcontracts and
administrative or management agreements were also to be provided, and upon receipt
of this information, the department was to conduct an "extensive and thorough back-
ground check" on the providers. The investigation was to cover "potential criminal
background, current status with the appropriate state licensing board, Medi-Cal provider
status, and a provider status check with the appropriate fiscal intermediaries." The
investigation was also to determine that all proposed plan facilities were appropriately
licensed or certified. Id. at 4.
After completion of the investigation, the facilities to be used by the PHP were
to be subjected to an on-site inspection by departmental staff prior to contract approval.
There was, however, no routine inspection by medical personnel. Id. See also CALI-
FoRNIA LEGISLATrvE ANALYST, A REvIEw OF THE REGULATION OF PREPAID HEALTI PLANs
16 (1973.) [hereinafter cited as 1973 LEGI sLATIvE ANALYsT REPORT]. The main purpose
of the precontract visit was to evaluate the adequacy of the physical plant in light of the
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overwhelming majority of these plans were in the Los Angeles area.191
As of December 1, 1972, 132,668 Medi-Cal beneficiaries were en-
rolled in the plans. 9 '
Capitation rates paid by the state varied significantly from plan
to plan. 93 No capitation rate was to exceed the 90 percent level of
costs for the same services provided in the same locale on a Medi-Cal
fee-for-service basis.' 94 Within that limitation, however, the department
represented that variation in capitation rates was based only on the geo-
graphical location of the plan, the services provided, 9 ' and the plan's
organizational structure.'9" Capitation rates in the Los Angeles area
ranged from $21.86 to $34.75 per month for an Old Age Security re-
cipient, and from $19.30 to $23.75 per month for an AFDC recipi-
ent.'
97
Once a contract was signed between the Department of Health
Care Services and a PHP, the plan could begin to seek enrollments
from Medi-Cal recipients. Since no capitation monies would be re-
ceived from the state until recipients were enrolled, the first few
months of any plan's existence would be spent securing these enroll-
ments.
Because the names and addresses of Medi-Cal recipients are con-
fidential and were therefore theoretically unavailable to PHP contract-
ors, 198 methods of enrollment became a serious concern for plans. 99
Information prepared by the plans could be mailed out by the state at
plan expense to prospective enrollees without breaching confidential-
number of enrollees the plan expected to serve. Cal. Dep't of Health Care Services,
Evaluation and Monitoring of Prepaid Health Plans at 5.
191. 1972 PILOT PRoJEcT REPORT, supra note 87, at Table I.
192. Id. Each contract entered into by the department with a prepaid health
plan provided for a maximum enrollment within a specified service area.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 7.
195. Not all plans were required to provide all covered services under Medi-Cal.
Cal. Stat. 1971, ch. 577, § 38, at 1131 (repealed 1972). Medi-Cal recipients enrolled
in such plans would receive specified services from the plan, and other services from
other providers with fee-for-service reimbursement. The most common type of covered
service which was excluded from plan contracts was dental service.
196. 1972 PILOT PRoJECT REPORT, supra note 87, at 7.
197. Id. at Table I.
198. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 10850 (West 1972), as amended, (West Supp.
197,).
199. The standard procedures developed for marketing prepaid group practices were
designed for enrollment of organizational memberships. They had minimal usefulness
for the PHP seeking to enroll a Medi-Cal recipient population. See HEALTH SERvICES
& MENTAL HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, MARKET-
INO PRE-PAIm HEALTH PLANS (1972).
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ity.20 0  This, however, proved to be a relatively ineffective method of
securing enrollments.0 1 Most plans decided to rely instead on door-
to-door solicitation in low income neighborhoods. 2
The Problems Begin
The problems that were to arise in the PHP program in the next
few months should not have come as a great surprise to the Reagan
administration. As early as September 21, 1971, when the Depart-
ment of Health Care Services began consideration of non-pilot PHP
contracts, Chester Jones, then in charge of the Los Angeles, San Ber-
nardino, and San Diego offices of the department's investigation section,
sent a memorandum to his superiors outlining potential problems in the
new PHI program. 3
Jones warned that several applicants for PHP contracts were under
investigation by the department for alleged fraudulent activities in the
Medi-Cal fee-for-service program. Jones also warned of potential
abuses which might arise in the PHP program. For example, contract-
ors might deliberately fail to provide proper and adequate medical care
or might discourage recipients from securing necessary medical atten-
tion. By thus minimizing utilization, plans would maximize profits
since capitation payments would not have to be expended for medical
services. Inadequate staffing might be employed to further minimize
patient utilization. Jones also cautioned that PHP contractors could en-
roll thousands of recipients during an initial period, receive capitation
payments from the state without providing care, and then declare bank-
ruptcy.
204
Despite this warning, a directive was issued less than two weeks
later which instructed investigators to conduct only limited background
investigations of PHP contract applicants. 20 5 Even the presence of un-
favorable background investigations, however, did not always deter the
department from contracting with questionable providers.
20 6
200. Cal. Stat. 1971, ch. 577, § 34.4, at 1124 (repealed 1972).
201. Special Meeting on Prepaid Health Plans: Enrollment and Marketing Proce-
dures, Before Assembly Comm. on Health, 1973 Reg. Sess. 75 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as 1973 Enrollment and Marketing Hearings].
202. Id.
203. Cal. Dep't of Health Care Services, Potential Problems with Some PHIP
Contractors, September 21, 1971, contained as Exhibit No. 9, lackson Committee Hear-
ings, supra note 163, at 37 (internal memorandum by Chester Jones).
204. Id.
205. P. Newlin, Memorandum to Investigation Staff of the Cal. Dep't of Health
Care Services, September 27, 1971, contained as Exhibit No. 10 in Jackson Committee
Hearings, supra note 163, at 38.
206. See, e.g., Cal. Dep't of Health Care Services, Agent Report on Edward Rubin,
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On October 5, 1972, the Los Angeles Times reported the picket-
ing of the offices of the DePaulo Health Plan.20 7  The demonstrators
complained about misrepresentation by DePaulo enrollers, failures to
provide quality medical services, and failures to provide promised
transportation to plan clinics.2"' Picketers reported being approached
by women in nurses' uniforms who told them that if they did not enroll
their Medi-Cal benefits would be terminated. 09 Others reported re-
ceiving prescriptions for sick children without any observation of the
patient by a physician.21 0 On November 10, 1972, the Los Angeles
Times reported that PHP contractors were minimizing their costs by
providing inappropriate and substandard care to the poor.2 '
In spite of these early warnings, the role of the department's In-
vestigation Bureau was limited even further. Responsibility for investi-
gation of complaints regarding prepaid health plans was taken out of
its hands, and investigators were instructed to limit their involvement
to cases in which the Monitoring Unit of the Prepaid Health Plan Bu-
reau or other bureau employees discovered violations of law requiring
a criminal investigation.21 2
Responsibility for field investigations was assigned instead to John
Blaul, a former Navy medical corpsman, whose only investigative ex-
perience had been six weeks training at the Riverside, California, Sher-
iff's Academy.213 Despite his lack of experience, Blaul substantiated
numerous allegations of forged enrollments by PHPs, misrepresenta-
M.D., Dec. 3, 1970 (on file at San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance Founda-
tion offices).
207. L.A. Times, Oct. 5, 1972, Westside section, at 1, col. 5, reprinted in Los
ANGELES COUNTY HEALTH RIGHTS ORGANIZATION, HEALTH RIGHTS HANDBOOK 43 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as HEALTH RIGHTS HANDBOOK]. The Los Angeles Times played
an especially important role in the early months of the PHP program by investigating
and reporting on violations within the program. Part of the following chronology
is contained in Jackson Committee Hearings, supra note 163, at 8-13. The chronology
should be viewed as descriptive rather than inclusive. The actual number of reports
and incidents relating to prepaid health plans far exceed the number contained here.
208. L.A. Times, Oct. 5, 1972, Westside section, at 1, col. 5, reprinted in HEALTH
RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 207, at 43.
209. Santa Monica Evening Outlook, Oct. 5, 1972, at 8, col. 1, reprinted in HEALTH
RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 207, at 44.
210. Id., col. 2.
211. See L.A. Times, Nov. 10, 1972, at 1, col. 4.
212. E. Chamberlin, Memorandum to All Investigative Offices of the Cal. Dep't
of Health Care Services, Nov. 14, 1972, contained as Exhibit 11 in Jackson Committee
Hearings, supra note 163, at 38-39.
213. Jackson Committee Hearings, supra note 163, at 38 (testimony of Jonathan
Cottin, Investigator for the Minority). The affidavit of John Blaul was retained in
the files of the subcommittee as confidential,
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tions by plan enrollers claiming to be state and local welfare depart-
ment employees, enrollers wearing nurses' or doctors' white coats, and
poor or non-existent medical care.114  Blaul later reported to United
States Senate investigators that although his superiors told him that con-
tract managers2 15 would correct these violations, the same violations
arose week after week against the same plans.21 6 Blaul further re-
ported that he was consistently discouraged by his supervisor from con-
ducting in-depth investigations of these recurring complaints.217
For approximately one year, Blaul was the only person assigned
to PHP field investigations despite the tremendous growth within the
program.21s All of Blaul's investigative files were later lost within the
Sacramento office of the Department of Health Care Services. 19
On December 10, 1972, the Los Angeles Times disclosed that 500
complaints against P-P contractors had been received by the Los An-
geles County Medical Association during the preceding eight weeks.
PEP enrollees reported clinic closures during evening hours and non-
availability of physicians during daytime hours. The article revealed
that some PHP investors anticipated a 2500 to 3000 percent return on
their investments.220 On January 10, 1973, the San Pedro News Pilot
reported a warning from the Los Angeles County Health Rights Or-
ganization (LACHRO) to Medi-Cal beneficiaries that they should "in-
vestigate before giving up Medi-Cal [fee-for-service] benefits." ''
214. Id. at 39.
215. Contract managers were employees of the Department of Health Care Services
within the Prepaid Health Plan Bureau who were assigned to monitor the operations
of specific prepaid health plans.
216. Jackson Committee Hearings, supra note 163, at 39 (testimony of Jonathan
Cottin).
217. Id. at 40.
218. J. Cottin, Memorandum to PHP Case File on C. Blake, Mar. 10, 1975, con-
tained in Jackson Committee Hearings, supra note 163, at 40.
219. Id.
220. L.A. Times, Dec. 10, 1972, § 2, at 1, col. 1. On January 23, 1973, the
Times reported the rejection by the state of a PHP contract proposed by the Whittacker
Corporation of Los Angeles. The proposed contract was refused on the grounds that
the prepaid health plan was to be run for profit. Ironically, the proposed profit was
to be 5%. L.A. Times, Jan. 23, 1973, § 1, at 3, col. 5.
The governing legislation did not prohibit for-profit PHPs, but the department
concluded that a for-profit entity would violate the State Medical Practice Act. Exhibit
No. 19, Jackson Committee Hearings, supra note 163, at 95-96. In the 1972 regular
session, A.B. 1527 was introduced to allow private corporations to operate PHPs for
profit. This bill, however, was vetoed by Governor Reagan. FINAL CALENDAR OF
LEGISLATIVE BusnwsS, ASSEMBLY FINAL HISToRY, 1972 Reg. Sess., at 584.
221. San Pedro News Pilot, Jan. 10, 1973, reprinted in HEALTH RIGHTS HANDBOOK,
supra note 207, at 40. The Los Angeles County Health Rights Organization had
grown out of the DePaulo demonstrations in the summer of 1972. The organization
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LACHRO described the plight of one enrollee who had called her PHP
requesting emergency medical transportation. She had received it two
days later.22 In another incident, an enrollee with an ulcer had had to
turn to a Free Clinic for care after being unable to get an appointment
with her plan.22 LACHRO also warned of high pressure door-to-door
salesmen dressed in doctors' uniforms or representing themselves as
county social workers or state employees. 24 Since an enrollee in a
prepaid health plan could only visit providers who participated in the
plan, LACHRO cautioned recipients not to rely on enroller promises
that they could continue to see their own physicians.2 25
On January 29, 1973, the Los Angeles Times published an edi-
torial in response to an announcement by the Reagan administration
that coverage of all Medi-Cal recipients under prepaid health plans
would save California taxpayers $150 million to $300 million per
year.22 6  The Times argued that while "[alny such savings would be
welcome . . . it must not come about by shortchanging the state's 2.4
million medically indigent." The editorial noted the failure of the De-
partment of Health Care Services to establish any standards for prepaid
health plans, and urged that no new contracts be negotiated until stand-
ards were established. It also pointed to the 34 percent rate of disen-
rollment from plans, and the repeated reports of failures by the plans
to provide required services, especially 24 hour a day emergency serv-
ices. The editorial concluded that "as quality controls are improved,
costs will rise and the expected tax saving will diminish. But substand-
ard care for the medically indigent must not be tolerated." '2 7
On February 15, 1973, the Times reported that the state contract
with Innovative Health Systems had been cancelled because one of the
plan's hospitals lacked accreditation and because of poor quality phar-
macy services. 2
On February 24, 1973, the Times reported that the Comprehen-
sive Health Planning Council of Los Angeles County had asked the Los
was established to educate Medi-Cal beneficiaries and assist them in disenrolling from
PHPs. See Affidavit of Vera Ollie Davis McClendon, Jackson Committee Hearings,
supra note 163, at 7-8. See also HEALTH RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 207, at 1-2.
222. San Pedro News Pilot, Jan. 10, 1973, reprinted in HEALTH RIGHTS HANDBOOK,
supra note 207, at 40.
223. Id.
224. Id. Because of such abuses, the Department of Health on September 5, 1973,
banned door-to-door solicitation in Los Angeles and Orange Counties. L.A. Times,
Sept. 6, 1973, § 1, at 23, col. 3.
225. Id.
226. L.A. Times, Jan. 29, 1973, § 2, at 6, col. 1.
227. Id.
228. L.A. Times, Feb. 15, 1973, § 1, at 27, col. 1.
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Angeles District Attorney, the California Attorney General, and the
Department of Consumer Affairs to investigate fraudulent enrollment
practices by prepaid health plans.22 9 A statement issued by Dr. Joseph
F. Boyle, council president, declared that "[t]he enrollment practices
appear to have been designed to prey upon the naivete, language diffi-
culties, state of social dependence, and fears of poor people, particu-
larly members of minority groups." Dr. Boyle went on to charge that
the Department of Health Care Services "has either been the witting
accomplice in deceitful enrollment practices or has been grossly negli-
gent in carrying out its responsibility." The statement described many
P-Ps as a serious threat to the mental and physical well-being of Medi-
Cal enrollees.230
On February 27, 1973, the Times published another editorial re-
garding PHPs. This editorial noted the report of the Comprehensive
Health Planning Council and stated that while the concept of prepaid
health care was a good one, "the program is now clearly deficient and
widely distrusted by the public, with good reason."
'231
On April 5, 1973, the Department of Health Care Services or-
dered Marvin Health Services to cease enrollment and improve plan
operations. The department noted numerous patient complaints and
high disenrollment rates, and also pointed out that Marvin enrollment
had been previously terminated during the period November 15, 1972,
through December 15, 1972, because the plan had enrolled Medi-Cal
recipients in areas of Los Angeles which lacked accredited plan facili-
ties. One week later the department announced the opening of a Los
Angeles office to investigate complaints concerning PHPs.
232
On April 29, 1973, the New York Times reported that Teamster
consultant Allan Dorfman and Teamster president Frank Fitzsimmons
had allegedly arranged with three reputed California Mafia figures to
enroll Teamster Union members in Marvin Health Services in exchange
for a split in kick-backed funds.233
In May 1973, Chester Jones, who had repeatedly requested au-
thority to investigate the large number of P-P complaints that he had
received, was relieved of his command of the San Diego and San Ber-
229. L.A. Times, Feb. 24, 1973, § 2, at 1, col. 5. The Comprehensive Health
Planning Council of Los Angeles is one of a number of agencies that plan and coor-
dinate the delivery of health services in specified areas.
230. Id. at 10, col. 4.
231. L.A. Times, Feb. 27, 1973, § 2, at 6, col. 1.
232. Id., Apr. 14, 1973, § 2, at 1, col. 5.
233. N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1973, § 1, at 55, col. 6.
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nardino investigations field offices of the Department of Health Care
Services. 34
On June 15, 1973, Medical World News reviewed the recent de-
velopments within the California prepaid health plan program.135  The
article asserted that the lessons learned in California would affect the
delivery of health care nationally by helping to shape attitudes and leg-
islation. 23 6  The report also discussed one particularly unfavorable
evaluation of the quality of care offered by the California Medical
Group,237 the provider of medical services for the largest P-P con-
tractor in the state.2
3 8
234. Testimony of J. Cottin, Jackson Committee Hearings, supra note 163, at
41. The frustration experienced by Mr. Jones was apparently shared by other in-
vestigators. Gerald B. Rohlfes, who became chief of the Investigations Section in
March 1973, later testified that the decision to reduce the role of the investigations
section "was viewed by some of our staff as an effort by our Executive Staff to cover
up or at least take the heat off the PHP Program which our Management was anxious
to sell from a political standpoint." Jackson Committee Hearings, supra note 163,
at 131.
235. HMOs' Stormy Tryout in Los Angeles Area, MEDICAL WORLD NEWS, June
15, 1973, at 17.
236. Id.
237. The unfavorable evaluation discussed in this article was reached in a report
prepared for the Teamsters Union by a group of investigators under the direction of
Dr. Lester Breslow, dean of the UCLA School of Public Health. California Council
for Health Plan Alternatives, California Medical Group (CMG) Evaluation Report,
Dec. 6, 1972, contained as Exhibit No. 21 in Jackson Committee Hearings, supra
note 163, at 311. The report listed several major deficiencies in the staffing and
hospitalization practices of CMG, including a ratio of full-time physicians to patients
in the plan of 1:1,375. This compared unfavorably with the physician-patient ratios
of 1:1,000 and 1:1,200 at two separate Kaiser facilities. The ratios of pediatricians,
internists, and obstetrician-gynecologists to plan enrollees were also far below those
in effect in other health maintenance organizations. Although CMG had a total patient
population of over 100,000, for instance, it did not have a single obstetrician on its
staff. The ratio of pediatricians to patients was 1:55,000, which compared unfavorably
with the range of 1:4,545 to 1:10,357 in the other prepaid plans used as study com-
parisons. Jackson Committee Hearings, supra note 163, at 313-14.
The report was equally critical of CMG hospitalization practices. First, it noted
that although the Los Angeles area had many excellent hospitals from which to choose,
CMG sent most of its patients to several small proprietary hospitals, one of which
was not even accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals. Sec-
ond, the number of hospital admissions per 1,000 enrollees per year and number of
hospital days per 1,000 enrollees per year were significantly lower in CMG than in
other health care plans in California. Finally, the research team was critical of CMG's
peer review system. Under this system the work of plan physicians was rated accord-
ing to the norm of other doctors within the group rather than according to the norm
of the entire medical community or to a standard of acceptable care developed by
experts in the various medical specialties. Id. at 314-17.
238. California Medical Group is one of the complex of companies that provides
medical services to Consolidated Medical Systems. See JOINT LEGISLATIVE AuDiT
COMM., REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH:
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The Legislative Response
The lessons of the first few months of the prepaid health plan pro-
gram were not lost on the state legislature. Complaints about misrep-
resentation, profiteering, conflict of interest, and lack of standards for
assuring quality of care were translated into legislation by the end of
1972.
On March 15, 1972, several weeks before the first nonpilot con-
tract became effective, Assemblyman Waxman reintroduced his stand-
ard-setting legislation as A.B. 1496 with the cosponsorship of Republi-
can Assemblyman Gordon Duffy.239  A.B. 1496 was to establish, for
the first time, specific standards for the administration of the prepaid
health plan program in California. As it had done the year before,
the Reagan administration initially opposed the new legislation.240 The
administration position later changed, however, and the Waxman-Duffy
Prepaid Health Plan Act was passed by the legislature, and was ap-
proved by the governor on December 22, 1972.241 It became effective
as an urgency measure on July 1, 1973, although provisions of the act
also applied to existing PHP contracts that were renewed prior to that
date.2
42
A.B. 1496 required that all enrollments be voluntary and prohib-
ited the use of false advertising to induce enrollment.24 3 The granting
of monetary or other consideration for enrollment was also prohib-
ited.2 44 Written materials provided to Medi-Cal beneficiaries by plan
enrollers were to be approved by the department prior to distribu-
tion.245  As a further protection against enrollment fraud and other vio-
lations, the administrative hearing process was specifically made ap-
plicable to prepaid health plan complaints,2 40 giving dissatisfied recipi-
PREPAiD HEALTH PLANS, Doc. No. 172.1, 1974 Reg. Sess. 18 (Apr. 1974) [hereinafter
cited as April 1974 AuiTrroR GENERAL REPORT].
239. ASSEMBLY DAILY JouRNAL, 1972 Reg. Sess., Mar. 15, 1972, at 1030. For
a discussion of this bill as it was first introduced see note 149 supra.
240. Dwight Geduldig, then director of the Department of Health Care Services,
testified before the Assembly Health Committee: "We feel that the standards required
or sought in that piece of legislation are too restrictive when we are still in what
I would basically consider an experimental mode as far as pre-paid plans are concerned."
Interim Hearing on Health Maintenance Organizations Before the Assembly Health
Comm., 1972 Reg. Sess. 89 (1972).
241. Cal. Stat. 1972, ch. 1366, at 2718.
242. Id. § 10, at 2730.
243. Id. § 9, at 2726 (repealed 1974).
244. Id. Numerous Medi-Cal recipients reported such inducements to enroll as
free fried chicken and free tickets to the professional football games.
245. Id. at 2727.
246. Id. at 2726. The administrative hearing process is required by federal law
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ents some recourse, should the department fail to act on their com-
plaints.
A.B. 1496 established basic quality standards as well. The legis-
lation set minimum patient-physician ratios.24" The act also specified
that a PHP must provide at least five physicians representing pediatrics,
internal medicine, general surgery, and obstetrics-gynecology.248 PIPs
were directed to assign a primary care physician to every enrollee to
manage the enrollee's medical care.249  PHP facilities and providers
were required to be appropriately licensed and accredited. 50 The De-
partment of Health Care Services was mandated to "conduct periodic-
ally an onsite review of the level and quality of care, the necessity of
the services rendered, and the appropriateness of the services pro-
vided" by the PI-Ps.25' Each PHP was also required to conduct inter-
nal medical audits,252 and to make "all reasonable efforts to achieve,
by the third contract year, an enrollment of not more than 50 percent
Medi-Cal beneficiaries."
25
The Waxman-Duffy Act (A.B. 1496) also contained expanded pro-
visions relating to conflict of interest. The act prohibited the approval
or renewal of any contract if any officer or employee of the state or any
member of the legislature had any direct or indirect financial interest in
any plan or in any contract with the plan, or if the prepaid health plan
had offered or given anything of value to the officer, employee, or mem-
ber of the legislature for the purpose of influencing or attempting to
influence the approval or renewal of any contract with the department. -54
Although this legislation did not become effective until July 1,
1973, on January 30, 1973, the Department of Health Care Services
and is administered in California pursuant to CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 10950
(West Supp. 1976). A welfare recipient who is dissatisfied may request a hearing
before the state agency responsible for that program. Testimony is taken and a deci-
sion is rendered by the director of the responsible agency. This decision is binding
on the participants, and subject to judicial review under CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 1094.5
(West Supp. 1976).
247. Cal. Stat. 1972, ch. 1366, § 9, at 2723-24 (repealed 1974).
248. Id. at 2723.
249. Id. at 2724.
250. Id. at 2723.
251. Id. at 2725 (repealed 1974).
252. Id. at 2726 (repealed 1974).
253. Id. at 2725 (repealed 1974). The American Public Health Association had
warned, "[Tihere would be hazards in development of HMOs exclusively for the poor.
The quality standards of such organizations might have a tendency to deteriorate, even
with adequate financial support." Health Maintenance Organizations: A Policy Paper,
61 AMER. J. PUBL. HEALTH 2528, 2532 (1971).
254. Cal. Stat. 1972, ch. 1366, § 9, at 2724 (repealed 1974).
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promulgated regulations which contained many of the provisions of the
Act.255  The regulations also established several new standards. Plans
were required to have one acute hospital bed per 500 enrollees and
at least one licensed pharmacist per 2500 enrollees.250 The regula-
tions also expanded the information that plans were required to provide
to recipients.25r
The Problems Continue To Mount
Although the legislature had enacted specific standards and pro-
cedures for administration of the PHP program, problems continued
and multiplied in the months that followed. The new rules proved to
be only as effective as the departmental personnel that administered
them. Unfortunately, the department continued the policies of mini-
mal enforcement and accommodation that had characterized the pro-
gram from its inception. The written rules had changed; the unwritten
rules had not.
On July 5, 1973, the Los Angeles Grand Jury indicted an enroller
for the Harbor Health Services plan for forging the names of Medi-Cal
recipients on enrollment forms after those persons had refused to en-
roll.2 58 On July 17, 1973, the San Diego County District Attorney's
office filed a suit against Consolidated Medical Systems, Inc., for false
and misleading representations by its salesmen.259 On August 6, 1973,
the Los Angeles County District Attorney's office began a compre-
hensive investigation into enrollment violations by prepaid health
plans.26
0
On the same day, hearings on PHP enrollment practices were con-
ducted by the Assembly Committee on Health.261  In opening the
hearings, Chairman Henry Waxman noted that the "charges of misrep-
resentation and fraud continue to mount in such numbers that they can-
not be ignored."20 2 Assemblyman Waxman cited the case of a Medi-
255. CAL. ADMn. REG. 73, No. 5 (1973), as amended, CAL. ADMIJ. REG. 74, No. 3
(1974).
256. Id., adopting 22 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 51680(b)(3), (5) (1973), as amended,
CAL. ADitN. REG. 74, No. 3 (1974). These requirements could be waived by the
department, however. Id., adopting 22 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 51680(b) (1973), as
amended, CAL. ADMIN. REG. 74, No. 3 (1974).
257. Id., adopting 22 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 51860 (1973).
258. L.A. Times, Aug. 7, 1973, § 1, at 10, col. 1.
259. People v. Consolidated Medical Sys., No. 344567, (San Diego, Cal. Super.
Ct., filed July 17, 1972).
260. L.A. Times, Aug. 7, 1973, § 1, at 10, col. 1.
261. 1973 Enrollment and Marketing Hearings, supra note 201.
262. Id. at 1.
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Cal recipient who had been told by an enroller that President Nixon
wanted to cut off her medical assistance. The recipient was told to
sign a form provided by the enroller if she wanted to maintain her
Medi-Cal eligibility. The form turned out to be an enrollment applica-
tion for a PHP.263 Representatives from various plans explained their
procedures for securing enrollments. One plan representative testified
to enrolling 6,000 Medi-Cal recipients in two weeks through door-to-
door solicitation. 264  Enrollers in this plan were paid base salaries of
nearly $8000 per year plus $3 per enrollment contract. 265  The plan
representative acknowledged that the state did not review the back-
ground of enrollers, nor did the state ask the plans to terminate solici-
tors against whom complaints had been filed.266
Plan representatives also testified that even where a recipient had
been fraudulently enrolled and decided to disenroll immediately, delays
in the disenrollment process could deprive the recipient of Medi-Cal
benefits for as long as six weeks. During that interim period, the plan
would continue to receive capitation payments for the enrollee. 26  It
was also admitted that Spanish speaking recipients were approached by
Spanish speaking enrollers, but were required to sign English language
contracts.
2 6 8
During the hearings, an official from the Department of Health
acknowledged that although contracts between the state and PHPs re-
quired the submission of background information regarding plan en-
rollers prior to commencement of solicitation, the state had not received
any such reports.26 9  The department representative also testified that
without door-to-door solicitation, plans would be unable to attract suffi-
cient numbers of Medi-Cal recipients to establish fiscal stability.2"'
He also noted that only four investigators were available across the entire
state to follow up on enrollment complaints..2 71  Assemblyman Duffy
then inquired about the requirement of the Waxman-Duffy Act that
the director "terminate contracts with any carrier if he finds that
the standards are not being complied with. '2 72  Department officials
263. Id. at 2.
264. Id. at 25.
265. Id. at 27.
266. Id. at 31.
267. Id. at 35-36.
268. Id. at 50.
269. Id. at 64-65.
270. Id. at 75-76.
271. Id. at 79.
272. Id. at 81. Assemblyman Duffy was referring to provisions of the 1972 Wax-
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were forced to acknowledge that despite the large number of com-
plaints, no plan had yet been terminated for enrollment violations.
27 3
On August 8, 1973, the Los Angeles Times reported that the
dental director of Consolidated Medical Systems had resigned because
of the repeated refusals by the plan to authorize needed dental services.
The director also charged that Consolidated Medical Systems would au-
thorize extractions rather than the more costly restorations.
274
On August 10, 1973, the state auditor general's office issued a
preliminary report on its investigation of the PHP program.2 75  The re-
port began by pointing out that the investigation had been frustrated
by Department of Health officials who had limited the investigators' ac-
cess to personnel and records.27  Despite these restrictions, the report
went on, the staff had documented numerous failures by the depart-
ment and violations of law by prepaid health plans.2 77  The Auditor
General found that the state was often paying more than once for serv-
ices: health care covered under the capitation payment was also billed
on a fee-for-service basis .27  The report also emphasized that PIPs
were actually profit-making entities that functioned through a system
of interlocking officers and directors and subsidiary relationships.279
Numerous cases of PHP representatives using fraudulent practices
to enroll Medi-Cal recipients were also documented in the report.
280
In addition, the report criticized the department for failing to coordi-
nate implementation of the PHP program with county welfare depart-
ments.28 1 Finally, the report charged the department with failing to
establish requirements for effective monitoring of PHPs including uni-
form accounting and medical auditing procedures. 282
man-Duffy Act, Cal. Stat. 1972, ch. 1366, § 9, at 2729, as amended, CAL. WELF. &
INST'NS CODE §§ 14304 (West Supp. 1976).
273. 1973 Enrollment and Marketing Hearings, supra note 201, at 81.
274. L.A. Times, Aug. 8, 1973, § 1, at 3.
275. JOINT LEGISLATIVE AuDrr COMM., REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR
GENERAL, PRELIMINARY REPORT OF REVIEW OF PREPAID HEALTH PLANS FOR MEDI-
CAL. RECIPIENTS, Doc. No. 136.2, 1973 Reg. Sess. (Aug. 1973.).
276. Id. at 1, 12-13.
277. Id. passim.
278. Id. at 5.
279. Id. at 6.
280. Id. at 7.
281. Id. at 8.
282. Id. at 9-10. Dr. Stubblebine, then state health director, disputed the findings
of the auditor general regarding double payment, administrative incompetence, and non-
cooperation by departmental staff with the investigation. In a news conference called
to respond to the auditor general's report, Stubblebine declared, "We claim, and I will
shout it from the rooftops, we have competent, adequate, skilled management." L.A.
Times, Aug. 29, 1973, § 1, at 22, col. 1.
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On November 15, 1973, the California Legislative Analyst issued
a report reviewing the administration of the P-P program."' This
study concluded that the Department of Health had failed to adequately
monitor PHPs and recommended that the department conduct more
comprehensive background checks of applicants for contracts, including
checks of both principals and providers.28 4 It was also recommended
that the department review the quality of care in facilities to be utilized
by the plan before an initial contract was let.
288
The legislative analyst noted that at least two PHPs received capi-
tation rates in excess of local fee-for-service rates. 88  The report also
noted the tremendous variance in capitation rates within a particular
locale."' It was therefore recommended that the department establish
an actuarial basis for establishing capitation rates based on the actual
costs of the health care services provided.288 The report criticized sig-
nificant turnover of staff within the department and urged that contract
managers be assigned specific contracts to supervise for substantial pe-
riods of time.289 New legislation was recommended to penalize plans
whose enrollers were found to be guilty of misrepresentation. 290  The
report urged revision of the form of contracts so that a recipient would
have to read and initial those sections governing limitations on the types
of care provided.291
The remainder of the study was concerned with insuring that
monies expended by the state were used to provide services to Medi-
Cal recipients. The report pointed out that many PHPs, although non-
profit corporations, actually acted as financial conduits for profit-making
organizations owned by the same individuals who operated the PHP.
292
The following chart prepared by the legislative analyst, describes
the basic structure:
283. 1973 LEISLATIVE ANALYST REPORT, supra note 190.
284. Id. at 16.
285. Id. at 17.
286. Id. at 21-22.
287. Id. at 19-20.
288. Id. at 23.
289. Id. at 28-29.
290. Id. at 33.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 47.
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The report recommended that prior to the execution of initial contracts
the state investigate the interrelationships between the PiP and those
organizations which provide services to PHP enrollees. The depart-
ment was urged to insure that these organizations actually did provide
services to plan enrollees2 94 While the legislative analyst did not dis-
cuss the theoretical worth of the PUP program, the report amounted to
a scathing indictment of the administration of the program in Califor-
2ia.2 95
293. Id. at 8.
294. See id. at 47-48.
295. The Department of Health responded to the legislative analyst's recommenda-
tions in a document prepared for the Assembly Health Committee. Cal. Dep't of Health,
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On December 13, 1973, the Assembly Health Committee con-
ducted a hearing in Los Angeles to receive testimony on the quality
of care received by Medi-Cal recipients in PHPs. 96 In opening the
session, committee chairman Henry Waxman reiterated his "strong
commitment" to the PHP concept, 9 7 but expressed his concern as well:
[W]e have learned that many of the prepaid plans under contract
did not exist prior to the Medi-Cal Reform Act of 1971 which
spawned the PHP program. Only 11 of the 48 plans provide pre-
paid health services to non-Medi-Cal recipients. Of this total,
85% are enrolled in but 2 plans. We are concerned that the State
is fostering "Medi-Cal mills" which will give recipients less than the
quality of care available to other citizens. Given the inexperienced
and untested number of medical groups under contract, we have
not received adequate evidence that the Department is requiring
the achievement of high standards which should be indicative of
the program .... 298
In the course of the hearing, the Health Committee reviewed re-
ports of PHP medical audits conducted by state personnel in 1973.09
Of the twelve plans described in the audit reports, seven were found
to have inadequate peer review or quality control. °00 Seven of the
Response to the Legislative Analyst's Recommendations Regarding the State Depart-
ment's Regulation of Prepaid Health Plans, Dec. 13, 1973 (undated document on file
at San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation). This statement accepted
many of the legislative analyst's criticisms.
296. Special Meeting on Prepaid Health Plans: Quality of Care, Before the Assem-
bly Health Comm. (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Quality of Care Hearings].
297. Id. at 3.
298. Id. at 1-2.
299. Id. at 4.
Although the first PHP contract became effective in April 1972 and ten others
were in operation by July 1, medical audits did not commence until October 1972.
Id. at 5-6.
300. Id., Appendix B, Summary of Medical Audits, at 4. Such a finding appeared
to contradict the substance of earlier department pronouncements concerning PHP peer
review. Earlier, the department had represented that "[elffectiveness, or the quality
of care provided, is assured through different mechanisms in the PHPs. All PHPs
have peer review mechanisms in operation." 1972 PILOT PROJECT REPORT, supra note
87, at 8.
Part of the reason for this disparity between department pronouncements and actual
PHP performance was the department's philosophy of "minimal regulation." In a docu-
ment prepared by the department one month prior to the Health Committee hearings,
the policy regarding regulation of PHP peer review mechanisms was explained: "Each
prepaid health plan is required, by Department regulations, to operate its own internal
peer review program. Although the Department has specified the areas of service
which the peer review program is to cover (inpatient hospitalization, certain outpatient
services, and the plan's drug services) the Department has not specified the exact
form or review procedures for a peer review program. The reason is that the wide
variety of PHP organizations facilitates the development of many different forms of
effective peer review programs." Summary of Current Program for Monitoring Quality
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PHPs described in the reports were also rated as having "unsatisfactory
medical work-up or physical examination. ' 30 1  Five plans were noted
for the "unavailability of simple lab work at each clinic." 02  In addi-
tion, six plans had inadequate or incomplete medical records systems
and five had illegible medical records.8 03 In all, the PHPs were rated
in fourteen quality related areas of performance. While two plans had
no deficiencies, the number of deficiencies in the other plans ranged
as high as eleven.30 4  One P-P in which deficiencies were noted in
ten of the fourteen quality areas had had its contract renewed by the
state several months after the negative audit.
30 5
Committee criticism was also leveled at the form of the medical
audits. Chairman Waxman commented:
[TIn far too many audits the stress is on the manner of operation,
not the performance of the operation. While the procedures for
auditing pharmaceutical and dental services appear excellent, too
little time is devoted to the appropriateness and quality of the de-
livery of professional medical practice and the overall quality of
organizational performance and responsiveness.
306
The chief of the medical audits section of the Department of Health
seemed to be in agreement. 07 He expressed an intention to involve
medical professionals and consultants in developing specific "process"
and "outcome" criteria for use in future evaluations.
308
The committee also heard testimony from several PHP enrollees.
One enrollee told of telephoning the "twenty-four hour emergency serv-
ice" of a Southern California PHP for over twelve hours before finally
of Care in Prepaid Health Plans (1973), contained as Appendix D in 1973 Quality
of Care Hearings, supra note 296.
301. 1973 Quality of Care Hearings, supra note 296, Appendix B, Summary of




305. 1973 Quality of Care Hearings, supra note 296, at 50-57.
306. Id. at 2.
307. Id. at 15 (testimony of Tom Heerhartz, Chief, Medical Audits Section). Mr.
Heerhartz stated, "We have been using the term 'medical audit' but medical audit really
applies to something other than what we are doing."
308. Id. at 15-19. During a "process" review, auditors evaluate the method by
which the physician arrived at a diagnosis and the method by which the physician
treated the condition once diagnosed. The physician's approach is ordinarily measured
against objective standards established for the diagnosis and treatment of specified dis-
orders. Under an "outcome" measurement system, the degree to which patients survive
and are restored to health is measured. If the treatment program for these patients
has been correct, this should be reflected in lower mortality and morbidity rates.
For a detailed discussion of quality of care measurement, see Donabedian, Evaluating
the Quality of Medical Care, 44 MILBANK MEM. FUND Q. 166 (July 1966).
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securing medical attention for her mother, who had gone into convul-
sions. s 9  Another told of spending a similarly long time attempting to
obtain emergency care from her PHP for an acute tubal infection.31 0
On April 16, 1974, a consent judgment was entered into in San
Diego between the county district attorney and Consolidated Medical
Systems to settle the pending case. 11 Without admitting liability, the
plan agreed to pay $30,000 in damages and agreed to the issuance of
an injunction requiring enrollers to accurately represent the terms and
conditions of enrollment.
On April 22, 1974, the Joint Legislative Audit Committee issued
a second report by the state auditor general on the PHP program. 1 2
The auditor general had investigated fifteen plans, fourteen of which pro-
vided services in Los Angeles County. 1 3 The report concluded that
of the $56.5 million paid to these fifteen plans by the Department of
Health between January 1, 1971, and December 31, 1973, only 48 per-
cent had actually been expended for health care services to Medi-Cal
recipients. The balance had been used for administrative costs or had
resulted in net profits to contractors or subcontractors. 14 Although
thirteen of the PHPs reviewed were technically nonprofit corporations,
the officers or directors of eight of the plans had formed profitmaking
entities which supplied various services to the nonprofit PHP.315  The
report therefore recommended legislation that would require that at least
75 percent of capitation payments be actually expended for health care
services.116
309. 1973 Quality of Care Hearings, supra note 296, at 117-18.
310. Id. at 131-33.
311. Consent Judgment, April 16, 1974, People v. Consolidated Medical Sys., No.
344567 (San Diego, Cal. Super. Ct., filed July 17, 1972). See text accompanying
note 259 supra.
312. April 1973 AUDITOR GENERAL REPORT, supra note 238.
313. Id. at 3-4. These plans included some of the largest in the state including
Consolidated Medical Systems, Marvin Health Services, and Omni-Rx Health Care.
At the time of the report, the fifteen selected plans represented 60% of the total
number of Medi-Cal recipients enrolled in all of the PHPs statewide. Id. at 5.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 13. The report repeated the conclusion of the legislative analyst:
"Through these affiliated profitmaking subcontractors, the officers and directors of the
nonprofit PHP contractors are able to obtain profits from what is ostensibly a nonprofit
operation. Also . . . the use of these interlocking firms makes it more difficult to
determine how much of the Department of Health's payments to the PHP contractors
actually is expended for health care services for Medi-Cal recipients and how much
results in net profits or is expended on executive salaries and other costs of adminis-
tration." Id. See text accompanying notes 292-93 supra.
316. Id. at 9.
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The report also concluded that the Department of Health had
failed to fulfill its statutory mandate to insure uniform accounting pro-
cedures, complete financial reporting, and routine fiscal auditing of
PHP contractors and their affiliated subcontractors. 17  The report rec-
ommended that in light of the failure of the Department of Health to
fulfill this mandate, responsibility should be transferred by legislation
to the Department of Finance.318
On May 23, 1974, the Los Angeles Times published an article
alleging that the Department of Health had demonstrated favoritism in
dealing with PHPs represented by a former Health Department offi-
cial.31 9 The article reported that two of these plans had received un-
precedented $70,000 interest-free loans from the state. 20  Also named
were three legislators who had assisted individual PHPs.321 The article
concluded by alleging that a deputy director of the Department of
Health had prevented cooperation between the Health Department and
the Los Angeles district attorney in the investigation of prepaid health
plans.
-3 22
On June 5, 1974, the United States Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare, published proposed regulations relating to health
maintenance organizations (HMOs) serving Medicaid recipients.3 23 As
finally approved on May 2, 1975, these regulations established several
new requirements.32 4  Health maintenance organizations were re-
quired to safeguard the confidentiality of eligible recipients. 25 All
subcontracts between IMOs and providers were now to be in writing.826
Within two years after the effective date of an initial contract with the
state, but not sooner than two years after the effective date of the regu-
lations, at least 50 percent of the plan enrollees were to be neither
Medicare nor Medicaid beneficiaries. This provision could only be
waived by the secretary of HEW. Other provisions restated many pro-
317. Id. at 11. Carriers and providers of MediCal benefits were required to insti-
tute uniform accounting and cost reporting systems. CA. WELF. & INST'NS CODE
§ 14161 (West 1972), as amended, CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 14161 (West Supp.
1976).
318. April 1974 AuDrroR GENERAL REPoRT, supra note 238, at 12.
319. Fairbanks, Medi-Cal Reform-Favoritism and Shoddy Services, L.A. Times,
May 23, 1974, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
320. Id. at 3, col. 1.
321. Id. at 6, col. 3-4.
322. Id. at 28, col. 3-4, 29, col. 1.
323. 39 Fed. Reg. 20042 (1974).
324. 40 Fed. Reg. 20516 (1975).
325. 45 C.F.R. § 249.82(c) (1) (viii) (1975).
326. 45 C.F.R. § 249.82(c) (1) (x) (1975).
327. 45 C.F.R. § 259.82(c)(5)(ii) (1975).
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tections already present under California law. These regulations be-
came effective on August 9, 1975.328
On July 10, 1974, the office of the auditor general issued a third
report on the administration of the PHP program in California. 29 The
report found that the Department of Health had inadequate controls
to prevent duplicate billings and payments by the state for health serv-
ices rendered to PHP enrollees.33 0 These duplicate payments were es-
timated at $4.2 million through December 31, 1973. 311 The auditor
general also found that the Department of Health had paid approxi-
mately $960,000 on a fee-for-service basis for dental services rendered
to enrollees in the Foundation Community Health Plan. These serv-
ices should have been provided at no cost under the PHP contract.3
The report reiterated earlier findings that the department had failed
to establish capitation rates on an actuarial basis as required by state
law.333  The report noted that several PHPs were paid different rates
although they were operating in the same geographical area and were
providing the same scope of services.3 4 Some of the rates charged
were found to exceed the fee-for-service costs and thus were in viola-
tion of state law. 3 5 Finally, despite the requirements of the Waxman-
Duffy Act and applicable Health Department regulations, 3  numer-
ous plans had failed to reimburse Los Angeles County for emergency
services rendered to PHP enrollees and the state had failed to review
these claims to insure payment.33 7  Many of the conclusions of the au-
328. 40 Fed. Reg. at 20519.
329. JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT COMM., REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR
GENERAL, DEP'T OF HEALTH PREPAID HEALTH PLANs, Doc. No. 172.2, 1974 Reg. Sess.
[hereinafter cited as July 1974 AUDITOR GENERAL REPORT].
330. Id. at 8.
331. Id. at 10.
332. Id. at 12.
333. Id. at 16. See text accompanying notes 286-88 supra.
334. July 1974 AUDITOR GENERAL REPORT, supra note 329, at 17. The disparity
within counties was eliminated effective July 1, 1974, when the Department of Health
established uniform rates within a county. D. Burkett, Uniform Prepaid Health Plan
Capitation Rates, June 28, 1974 (Dep't of Health internal memorandum to Jerry
Green).
335. Id. at 18. The department's fee-for-service estimates determined the highest
rates of payment allowable. Cal. Stat. 1972, ch. 1366, § 9, at 2723, as amended,
CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 14301 (West Supp. 1976).
336. PHPs were required to pay for emergency services rendered to plan enrollees
by non-plan providers. Cal. Stat. 1972, ch. 1366, § 9, at 2725; CAL. ADMIN. REG. 73,
No. 5 (1973), adopting 22 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 51841 (1973), as amended, CAL. ADMIN.
REG. 74, No. 3 (1974).
337. July 1974 AUDITOR GENERAL REPORT, supra note 329, at 19-23. The corre-
spondence between the county and the Department of Health regarding this problem
has been reprinted in Jackson Committee Hearings, supra note 163, at 17-21.
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ditor general were disputed by the Department of Health.338
On August 30, 1974, the Los Angeles Times reported that after
the Orange County Foundation Health Plan had closed down with a
$500,000 to $700,000 debt, its physicians had attempted to recoup
losses by billing Medi-Cal recipients for services compensated already
through the capitation payments. 339  A later study of the closing, con-
ducted by the office of the auditor general, concluded that the Depart-
ment of Health had failed to require the plan to comply with a number
of statutory, regulatory, and contractual obligations. 340  The violation of
these requirements by the plan included inadequate accounting proce-
dures, inadequate capitalization, and inadequate peer review. 34 1 The
study also criticized the department for failing to conduct required
medical audits, 42 for negotiating too many contracts in Orange County,
thereby creating undue competition,343 and for loaning $70,000 interest
free to the plan in violation of Health and Safety Code section 117 8.1 4
On September 10, 1974, the comptroller general of the United
States issued a report to the United States Senate which reviewed the
operation of the PHP program in California.3 45 The report evaluated
three areas of the state's program: (1) capitation rates; (2) enroll-
ment, disenroilment, and grievance procedures; and (3) quality of
services.3 40
In the area of capitation rates for PIPs, the comptroller general
found that in some cases per capita payments exceeded fee-for-service
estimates, and that rates were not established on a sufficient actuarial
basis.3 47  The report recommended that the secretary of HEW assist
in the development of an actuarial basis for establishing health mainte-
338. July 1974 AUDrrOR GENERAL REPORT, supra note 329, at 24-25.
339. L.A. Times, Aug. 30, 1974, § 1, at 3, col. 5-6.
340. JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT COMM., REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR
GENERAL, A REVIEW OF THE CAUSES FOR THE FAILuI E OF THE ORANGE COUNTY FOUN-
DATION PREPAID HEALTH PLAN ADMINISTERED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Doc.
No. 172.4, 1975 Reg. Sess. 4.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 11.
343. Id. at 14-16.
344. Id. at 18.
345. U.S. COMPTROLLER GENE .L REPORT TO SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, BETTER
CONTROLs NEEDED FOR HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS UNDER MEDICAID IN CAL-
IFORNIA (1974). The report had been requested by Senator Russell Long on March
6, 1973, because of the allegations which had been made "regarding possible impropri-
eties and inefficiencies" in certain PHPs. Id., Letter from Sen. Long to Elmer B.
Starts, Sept. 10, 1974, App. I, at 35.
346. Id. at i.
347. Id. at 11-14.
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nance organization capitation rates for Medicaid recipients and that a
federal surveillance mechanism be established to insure that HMO cost
would not exceed the cost of providing similar services under the fee-
for-service mode.1
48
The comptroller general also found that enrollment irregularities
continued to be a problem in the PHP program, and that this con-
tributed to a 6.2 percent average monthly turnover of enrollees. 49 The
study concluded that the basis for disenrollment listed on disenrollment
forms was often different than the actual reason expressed by the en-
rollee. The most common reasons for disenrollment not reflected
on disenrollment forms forwarded by the plans to the Department
of Health were misrepresentation in enrollment and dissatisfaction
with plan services.3"' The report therefore recommended that pro-
cedures for controlling enrollment misrepresentation be established
by the state, that disenrollment forms be promptly processed by plans,
that all HMOs be required to establish effective enrollee grievance pro-
cedures, and that HEW develop monitoring systems for use in other
states that would avoid the types of problems which arose in Califor-
nia.3
51
Finally, the comptroller general reported that neither HEW nor
California had developed standards with which to evaluate the quality
of PHP health care.3" 2 This failure was compounded by the failure
of the Department of Health to conduct medical audits in sufficient
depth to determine whether the PHP program had provided quality
medical services to enrollees.3 53 Moreover, the report found, medical
audits had not been conducted in the past as often as required by state
regulations due to the lack of medical audit staff.3' The comptroller
general therefore recommended that HEW develop procedures for
evaluating the quality of health maintenance organization care under
Medicaid, including requirements for standardized data reporting by
plans.
355
On October 2, 1974, a lawsuit was filed by twenty-three San Fran-
cisco Medi-Cal recipients against the American Health Care Plan and
348. Id. at 15.
349. Id. at ii, 27.
350. Id. at 24.
351. Id. at 27-28.
352. Id. at iii.
353. Id. at 29.
354. Id. at 31.
355. Id. at 34. For a discussion of the term Health Maintenance Organization
(HMO), see note 1 supra.
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against the director of the Department of Health. 586 The complaint
charged widespread enrollment violations as well as failures by the plan
to provide needed medical services. 857 Damages and injunctive relief
were demanded. The lawsuit also sought a writ of mandamus to com-
pel the director of the Department of Health to fulfill his obligation
to lawfully administer the P-P program.
On November 15, 1974, the Department of Health announced the
cancellation of the UMEDCO PiP contract because the plan was
$800,000 in debt and therefore did not have sufficient financial re-
serves.3' On November 23, 1974, the Times reported that because
of the failure of UMEDCO, an emergency plan had been established
to serve UMEDCO enrollees in county hospitals. 8 '
On December 27, 1974, Chester Jones, who had continued to
press for thorough investigations into P-P wrongdoing, charged that
the Reagan administration was attempting to punish him before its term
expired for his efforts to expose corruption in the P-P program.860
Jones alleged that staff investigations had discovered widespread en-
rollment violations, illegal referral of sick patients by plans to county
hospitals so that costs would be borne by county taxpayers, and deroga-
tory background information on applicants who were ultimately awarded
PHP contracts.
On December 31, 1974, just prior to leaving office, Governor
Reagan, conceding that his previous reforms had failed to curb soaring
356. Ortiz v. American Health Care Plan, No. 680-697 (San Francisco, Cal. Super.
CL, filed Oct. 2, 1974).
357. The complaint alleged that in one instance a child with a fever of 105 degrees
had been repeatedly denied emergency treatment and was forced to wait more than
thirteen hours before services were finally rendered. Exhibit A, Declaration of Jackie
Ortiz, id.
358. L.A. Times, Nov. 16, 1974, § 2, at 1, col. 3.
359. L.A. Times, Nov. 23, 1974, § 1, at 13, col. 1.
360. L.A. Times, Dec. 28, 1974, § 2, at 1, col. 1. In response to the inquiry
of the chief counsel of the Permanent Senate Subcommittee on Investigations (the
Jackson Committee), a California Department of Health representative characterized
Jones as a disgruntled employee and denied that there was anything more than coinci-
dence in his tranfer from Los Angeles to Sacramento three hours after the service
of a committee subpoena on the health director. Letter from Merle L. Shields to
Howard J. Feldman, Jan. 8, 1975, contained as Exhibit No. 12 in Jackson Committee
Hearings, supra note 163, at 43.
Shortly thereafter, Robert Gnaizda, acting director of the Department of Health
for the Brown administration, praised the efforts of Jones and two other department
investigators for bringing the problems of PHPs to the public's attention. Gnaizda
stated, "Under extraordinarily difficult circumstances you have remained true to your
beliefs and commitment to protect the public." Jackson Committee Hearings, supra
note 163, at 44-45.
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costs, called for another reform of Medi-Cal. Reagan proposed the
creation of PHPs which would serve all Medi-Cal recipients living in
a particular geographic area. This proposal, it was acknowledged,
would necessitate changes in state and federal law which required that
recipients have freedom of choice in selecting providers.3 61
Waxman-Duffy Is Amended
On March 5, 1973, even before the Waxman-Duffy Prepaid
Health Plan Act of 1972 had become effective, 6" its authors intro-
duced legislation to strengthen the state's ability to supervise the oper-
ation of PHPs and to further protect prospective enrollees.361 This leg-
islation was passed by both houses and signed into law by the governor
on September 23, 1974.364 The provisions of the amended Waxman-
Duffy Prepaid Health Plan Act became effective on January 1, 1975.3"5
Under these amendments, plans were required to provide pros-
pective enrollees with specific information on the affiliated medical
personnel, the services and benefits offered, the transportation arrange-
ments available, and the hours and days when plan facilities were
open.366 The amendments also expanded the information that plans
were required to provide to recipients once enrolled, including the pro-
cedures for obtaining services.3 617
PHPs were required to obtain prior written approval by the de-
partment before engaging in any marketing activities,3 8  and all mar-
keting materials were to be cleared by the department before being
used by a plan or an affiliated marketing organization. 69 Plans were
expressly prohibited from claiming that marketing representatives were
employees of the state or county, that the plan was endorsed by the
state or county, or that Medi-Cal benefits would be terminated if the
beneficiary did not enroll. 70 Penalties for misrepresentation included
revocation of particular methods of marketing, termination of new en-
361. L.A. Times, Jan. 1, 1975, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
362. Cal. Stat. 1972, ch. 1366, § 10, at 2730, established an effective date of
July 1, 1973. See notes 239-57 & accompanying text supra.
363. ASSEMBLY DAILY JOURNAL, 1973 Reg. Sess., Mar. 5, 1973, at 603.
364. FINAL CALENDAR OF LEGISLATIVE BusrNEss, ASSEMBLY FINAL HISTORY, 1973
Reg. Sess., at 391.
365. Cal. Stat. 1974, ch. 983, at 2036.
366. CAL. WELF. & INST'VS CODE § 14405 (West Supp. 1976).
367. Id. § 14406.
368. Id. § 14408.
369. Id.
370. Id. § 14409.
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rollments, forfeiture of all or part of the capitation payment for fraud-
ulently enrolled recipients, or termination of the contract.Y71 Benefici-
aries were also expressly given the right to disenroll under specified
circumstances172 and were required to be disenrolled within forty-five
days of filing the application for disenrollment.173  In addition, plans
were prohibited from enrolling Medi-Cal beneficiaries who resided out-
side of the contract service area. 74 The department was directed to
prescribe a standard contract that would be readily understandable to
enrollees.37 5
Improvements were also made in other areas relating to the pro-
vision of medical services. PHPs were required to provide the services
of an optometrist and an opthalmologist whenever the contract included
vision care services,316 and dental services were to be made available
to enrollees without prior screening or authorization.
77
All subcontracts entered into by a plan were required to be in
writing, and to be submitted to the department for approval.373 Medi-
cal audits, which the department previously had been required to con-
duct "periodically," were now required to be performed at least every
six months. 79
The 1974 amendments also strengthened the provisions of the
1972 Waxman-Duffy Act relating to public hearings. Any findings
that the prepaid health plan had complied with its contractual obliga-
tions were required to be based on the evidence presented at the public
hearing.38 0 Under the 1972 act the department could contract for a
minimum of one year with a plan; the 1974 amendments limited initial
contracts to a period of one year, and renewal contracts to a maximum
of two years. 31
The 1974 amendments also strengthened and broadened the con-
flict of interest provisions relating to PIPs.18 2  At the same time, the
department was required to file reports with the legislature on the in-
371. Id.
372. Id. § 14412. These circumstances now included cases where the beneficiary
had been fraudulently enrolled.
373. Id. § 14413.
374. Id. § 14402.
375. Id.
376. Id. § 14452.3.
377. Id. § 14452.4.
378. Id. § 14452.
379. Id. § 14456.
380. Id. § 14300.
381. Id. § 14302.
382. Id. §§ 14475-81.
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cidence of enrollment violations and the actions taken by the depart-
ment against violators .
383
The Brown Administration Attempts Reform
When the Brown administration assumed office in January 1975,
the problems besetting the PHP program were well known. The in-
dividual plans had failed to provide adequate health care for enrollees;
there had been widespread enrollment fraud; and there was growing
evidence of inadequate fiscal resources within many plans. The gov-
ernment's inability to cope with those problems was also apparent.
Health Department administrators had failed to enforce existing regula-
tions. Serious allegations of conflict of interest and possible corruption
within the department had been made. It had also become clear that
prophylactic legislation and regulations alone were inadequate to curb
provider abuses or to insure quality health care.
After frankly acknowledging the nature and scope of the problems
within the program, the Brown administration made several highly
visible attempts to solve those problems. Whether these attempts were
meant to succeed is problematical; as will be shown, these attempts were
largely unsuccessful. Perhaps, as some have suggested, this lack of
success was due in part to the administration's desire to avoid alienat-
ing the health plan lobby as a source of campaign contributions and
political support. In addition, the new administration lacked the
expertise necessary to understand and direct bureaucracies such as the
Department of Health.184  The Department of Health can be viewed
as an entrenched bureaucracy, with a tenured staff, largely able to sur-
vive any particular administration. As such, it will tend to resist (and
develop successful ways to resist) any outside threats to its internal work-
ings or to its relationships with health care providers. This section will
chronicle the present administration's difficulties in reforming the pro-
gram.
On January 16, 1975, a program white paper was prepared within
the Department of Health. 85 This internal memorandum outlined major
383. Id. § 14313.
384. See, e.g., Liebert, The State's Sick Health Department, S.F. Chronicle, Sept.
20, 1976, at 1, col. 1; He Says He's Not an Administrator, id., at 6, col. 1.
385. R. Lohmeyer, Program White Paper, Jan. 16, 1975 (internal Health Plans
Administration memorandum), contained as Exhibit No. 31 in Jackson Committee
Hearings, supra note 163, at 248. Although authored by Richard H. Lohmeyer, chief
of the Health Plans Administration, this memorandum apparently summarized the per-
ceptions shared by the state officials responsible for the operation of the PHP program.
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problems within the program and suggested solutions for those prob-
lems.
The memorandum acknowledged that the PIP program had been
administered with the attitude that the program was to be expeditiously
developed. 86  This attitude led the department to disregard inade-
quate financial resources when evaluating PHP contract proposals, and
resulted in restricted delivery of health services and occasional fiscal
collapse."" Because the requirements for data reporting by the plans
were similarly limited, the department was deprived of a means to eval-
uate the quality of care provided.388  The memorandum also empha-
sized that financial audits were so narrow in scope that they did not
reveal the actual distribution of state funds.s 89 The auditing procedure
seemed entirely incapable of exposing the affiliated profitmaking en-
tities that received the substantial portion of the capitation funds paid
to the plans.39 0  The memorandum therefore recommended expansion
of the audits to affiliated entities, and also urged the imposition of
higher tangible net equity requirements.3 9'
In the area of quality assurance, the memorandum pointed out
that medical audits by the department were inadequate due to the lack
of objective standards and clearly defined health quality objectives.
3 92
It recommended the establishment of auditing criteria which would
"stand independent of subjective evaluations on the part of review-
ers, 3 93 and promulgation by the department of standards for PIP peer
review.
394
In the area of marketing, the memorandum conceded that there
were documented cases of selective enrollment, but emphasized the de-
partment's difficulties in detecting such practices within a plan. 395
Lohmeyer concluded that, despite the problems of misrepresentation
by door-to-door solicitors, "[alt present there is no truly successful
alternative to knocking on doors in hopes of finding an eligible Medi-
386. Jackson Committee Hearings, supra note 163, at 249.
387. Id.
288. Id. at 250.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id. CAL.. WEr. & INST'NS CODE § 14450(c) (West Supp. 1976) required
PHPs to meet the tangible net equity requirements established by the Knox-Mills Health
Plan Act, Cal. Stat. 1965, ch. 880, § 1, at 2487 (repealed 1970) (replaced by Cal.
Stat. 1970, ch. 1028, § 4, at 1838 (repealed 1975)).
392. Jackson Committee Hearings, supra note 163, at 251.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 252.
395. Id. at 252-53.
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Cal beneficiary."3 96 Alternative solutions to these marketing problems
suggested in the memo included transferring all enrollment functions
to the state or the counties, establishing mandatory enrollment with an
option to disenroll, waiving confidentiality and thus allowing the PHPs
access to eligibility lists of Medi-Cal recipients, and granting area-wide
exclusive franchises.' 97
On January 22, 1975, Governor Brown asked the acting director
of the Department of Health, Robert Gnaizda, to investigate charges
of mismanagement within the department. 98  Gnaizda assembled a
team of lawyers and health professionals and commenced a study of
the department and its administration of the PHP program.
On January 28, 1975, poverty lawyers from all over California
called for an immediate termination of all PHP contracts. Those plans
wishing to challenge these terminations would have the burden of
showing that they were providing quality care. The attorneys charged
that the program was "rife with abuses" and that the legislation govern-
ing the PHP program should be revised to eliminate the economic in-
centives for providing minimal care.3 99
On February 9, 1975, the San Francisco Sunday Examiner and
Chronicle reported on the possiblity of more scandal within the Depart-
ment of Health.400  The article noted Lieutenant Governor Mervyn
Dymally's admission that while a state senator he had pushed through
legislation which had assisted a PHP in which he was a substantial
shareholder.4"' The article also noted the pending investigation by the
Gnaizda team and revealed that in order to facilitate the investigation
Gnaizda had ordered all important files in the department sealed.
On February 11, 1975, Governor Brown announced that the state
would not approve any new PHP contracts and would only renew cur-
rent plans until June 30, pending a review of the entire PHP program.
Brown also announced the appointment of Steven Passin, a former
employee of the American Medical Association, as head of the Alter-
native Health Systems Division, charged with the responsibility of ad-
ministering the PHP program.
4 2
On February 12, 1975, Acting Health Director Gnaizda disclosed
that his investigators had presented the attorney general's office with
396. Id. at 253.
397. Id.
398. Id. at 111 (testimony of Steven Passin).
399. L.A. Times, Jan. 29, 1975, § 1, at 3, col. 5.
400. S.F. Sunday Examiner & Chronicle, Feb. 9, 1975, § A, at 1, col. 6.
401. Id. at 22, col. 6.
402. S.F. Chronicle, Feb. 12, 1975, at 1, col. 8.
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extensive documentation of illegal acts committed by employees of a
number of prepaid health plans.4"' Gnaizda insisted, however, that
there were no ongoing scandals and indicated that the state did not in-
tend to abandon the concept of prepayment for Medi-Cal recipients.
On March 13, 1975, Senator Henry Jackson convened two days
of hearings on the California PHP program by the Permanent Senate
Subcommittee on Investigations. 404 In opening these hearings, Senator
Jackson explained that testimony would demonstrate "the absolute
moral and ethical bankruptcy of elements of the health care indus-
try."40 5  Senator Jackson went on to emphasize that "[prepaid health
care for the poor] is a good idea, that should not be abandoned because
men without consciences, profiteers, and scam artists took the initiative
in California from those with good intentions. 40 8
In testimony before the Jackson Committee, Steven Passin, Alter-
native Health Systems Division chief, reported that the investigators
appointed by Acting Health Director Gnaizda had confirmed many of
the charges contained in earlier reports critical of PIP administra-
tion.407  The Gnaizda team documented high level state mismanage-
ment of the program. 08 It also found a complete lack of emphasis
by the department on preventive health services, no objective method
403. S.F. Chronicle, Feb. 13, 1975, at 1, col. 5.
404. Jackson Committee Hearings, supra note 163, at 1.
405. Id. at 2.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 111.
408. Id. Some of the mismanagement problems were discussed in an internal
memorandum prepared for Robert Gnaizda by three attorneys of the investigative team.
F. Hiestand, P. Coppelman & D. Epstein, Investigation of Department of Health's
Policy Toward Prepaid Health Plans, Apr. 1975 (on file at San Francisco Neighborhood
Legal Assistance Foundation) [hereinafter cited as Hiestand Memorandum].
The memorandum discussed a group of PUP contract proposals which had been
approved despite the fact that members of the departmental staff who had reviewed
them agreed that they were inadequate. Impetus for the granting of state funds ap-
peared to have come from the director of Health Care Services, who allegedly expressed
a desire to secure approval prior to July 1, 1973. After that date public hearings
were required before individual contracts could be let. Cal. Stat. 1972, ch. 1366, §
9, at 2726, as amended, CAL. WELF. & INsT'Ns CoDE § 14300 (West Supp. 1976).
Hiestand Memorandum, supra, at 9. The memorandum also noted that "[tjhe Depart-
ment had no set procedures for passing on proposals and no systematic or extensive
requirements which proposals had to meet." Id. at 10.
One month after the funding of the last of this group of proposals, the state
contract analyst in charge of working them up accepted employment with the consulting
firm which had prepared them. Id. at 10. Also documented in the memorandum
was the case of a southern California PHP whose contract was renewed despite evi-
dence of a systematic practice of selective enrollment by the plan. Id. at 23-26.
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of measuring quality of care, and no consistent direction in any aspect
of the PHP program. 40 9
Passin testified further regarding the Brown administration's plans
to remedy these problems. He said that a PHP advisory committee
would be established through which the Health Department would form
"a partnership with the private sector. '410  This committee would rec-
ommend ways to implement quality assurance and regulation in the
areas of enrollment and marketing, data retrieval, and financial and
management disclosure.41" '
Other testimony presented to the Jackson Committee indicated
that quality of care was indeed still a problem under the new adminis-
tration. Dr. Joseph Mells, a physician member of a department medi-
cal audit team, reported to the committee that "[h]aving reviewed, first
hand, the quality of care at these [PHP] clinics, I can say that it is as
unacceptable today as it was when I started in October 1974. ''412 Mells
409. Jackson Committee Hearings, supra note 163, at 111 (testimony of Steven
Passin). With regard to the level of quality monitoring under the previous administra-
tion, the Gnaizda team noted in particular a memorandum to the chief of the medical
audits section, in which twenty-nine medical audit reports were analyzed. Memorandum
from Mel Saferstein to Tom Heerhartz, Analysis of Prepaid Health Plan Audit Reports,
Oct. 16, 1973. The investigators summarized: "[O]f the twenty-nine (29) reports
reviewed more than 55% of the medical charts lacked clarity, were poorly organized,
and not legible; 41.3% showed a low rate of dental utilization by enrollees . . . more
than 34% were in agreement that there was an inadequate follow-up system for missed
appointments; 34% showed no dental peer review system; more than 37% indicated an
absence of licensed support staff working in the clinic or physician's office; almost 7%
found that unlicensed physicians were treating people in the plans; and more than 34%
identified outdated medications being used in the plans." Hiestand Memorandum, supra
note 408, at 3-4 (punctuation added).
410. Jackson Committee Hearings, supra note 163, at 112 (testimony of Steven
Passin).
411. Id.
412. Jackson Committee Hearings, supra note 163, at 205 (statement of Dr. Joseph
H. Mells). Dr. Mells gave examples of what he considered unacceptable medical treat-
ment and inadequate medical recordkeeping. One PHP enrollee had received no treat-
ment for more than two months after having been diagnosed as having gonorrhea.
In another case, the chart of a five-year old male patient indicated that the boy
had had surgery for an ovarian cyst in 1968.
The doctor testified regarding inadequate diagnostic procedures as well. At one
PHP, he disclosed, physicians diagnosed vaginal infections "purely by odor"--without
the use of laboratory procedures. Mells said he had once reported to his departmental
superior that several PHP clinics had medical deficiencies so severe that they should
be reevaluated within thirty days. He had not been allowed, however, to reaudit these
facilities.
When questioned regarding this incident by Senate investigators, Robert Ledbetter,
chief of the Quality Evaluation Section, said that the thirty day reaudit would have
been a logistical nightmare for the PHPs. Jackson Committee Hearings, supra note
163, at 212.
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reported that in December 1974, the chief of the PHP Quality Evalua-
tion Section had led him to believe that the department was prepared
to act against P-Ps which rendered substandard care.413  More re-
cently, however, he had been informed by the same official that "[o]ur
mission was not to discipline these clinics but to educate them to write
up the charts properly."'4 14
Dr. Mell's conclusions regarding the state's unwillingness to discip-
line poorly performing PHIPs were shared by another member of the
medical evaluation staff, Refugio Garcia. When asked whether a clinic
or provider had ever been asked to leave the PHIP program after a neg-
ative medical audit, Mr. Garcia testified, "There have been instances
where the State has taken appropriate action; but I would say that these
instances are far too few .... In the medical audit findings, we are
finding the same deficiencies continually ... .
On April 1, 1975, the Los Angeles Times disclosed that the
Brown administration had decided to continue the PEP program and
that three officials from the Department of Health had testified on be-
half of one of the plans in a law suit filed by the attorney general a.4 1
Department officials were quoted as acknowledging that the challenged
plan had failed to meet net equity requirements, 17 but that the depart-
ment had decided to waive this obligation.
On April 6, 1975, the San Francisco Sunday Examiner and Chron-
icle reported on the contract renewal hearing for the American Health
Care Plan, a San Francisco-based PHP. The plan had been assailed
in bitter testimony by employees of the San Francisco Department of
Social Services, by the director of a medical center in Chinatown, by
a plan physician, and by several enrollees. The Department of Health
413. Jackson Committee Hearings, supra note 163, at 206 (statement of Dr. Joseph
Mells).
414. Id.
415. Jackson Committee Hearings, supra note 163, at 233 (testimony of Refugio
Garcia). Garcia also noted that "economics, not good professional judgment, de-
cides the level of care at . . . PHP's." Id. at 211. Garcia went on to describe inci-
dents that had occurred during medical audits of plans: "One device employed by
a medical plan clinics [sic] is to use a holding room for observation of critically
ill persons, rather than refer such enrollees to hospital emergency rooms. In October,
1974 I was a member of a medical audit team evaluating that medical plan. We
observed a patient lying semicomatose in a holding room. Nurses told us he had
low blood pressure, had consumed a pint of gin and an unknown quantity of mellaril,
a tranquilizing drug. Two hours after we first saw him, we heard a nurse cry out
that the man was 'stiffening' and it was an emergency. An ob-gyn, the only doctor
then in the clinic, ordered the patient sent to the hospital." Id.
416. LA. Times, Apr. 1, 1975, § 1, at 3, col. 4.
417. See note 391 & accompanying text supra.
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contract manager for the plan testified that after conducting a survey
of only 15 of the 8,000 plan enrollees, she had concluded that the PHP
was well accepted by its patients.418
On April 24, 1975, the auditor general issued a report reviewing
administrative functions within the Foundation Community Health Plan
in Sacramento and the American Health Care Plan in San Francisco.4 19
The report concluded that the Department of Health had paid an esti-
mated $1.6 million more for health services provided by the Founda-
tion Plan during 1974 than such services would have cost on a fee-for-
service basis.420  The extra costs had been generated by the high capit-
ation rates charged by the Foundation Plan. The study emphasized
that the departmental rationalization for this discrepancy, that the
Foundation Plan had enrolled a disproportionate number of sick peo-
ple, had never been documented. 421  The report also concluded that
the Foundation Plan had failed to satisfy the tangible net equity re-
quirements of the Knox-Mills Health Plan Act.
4 22
On May 5, 1975, after the department announced that it would
extend the contract with the American Health Care Plan for a period
of ninety days, a lawsuit was filed against it seeking to set aside the
contract renewal.
42
One month later the San Francisco Chronicle reported a stormy
contract renewal hearing on the American Health Care Plan. 24  The
hearing, which started at approximately 4 P.M., was not completed un-
418. S.F. Sunday Examiner & Chronicle, Apr. 6, 1975, § 1, at 23, col. 1; Dep't of
Health, Transcript of Pub. Hearing, Am. Health Care Plan, Prepaid Health Plan Contract
Continuation, Apr. 4, 1975 at 7-8, 11. A reading of the testimony discloses that the
newspaper inaccurately described the size of the survey sample. The text of this article
reflects the sample size specified in the testimony, not the newspaper.
419. JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT COMMrITEE, OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL,
A REvIEw OF THE ADMINISTRATION BY THE DEP'T OF HEALTH OF CONTRACTED PRE-
PAID HEALTH PLANs WITH THE FOUNDATION COMMUNITY HEALTH PLAN AND THE AMER-
ICAN HEALTH CARE PLAN, Doc. No. 172.5, 1975 Reg. Sess.
420. Id. at 8.
421. Id. at 7.
422. Id. at 10, 14.
423. Ortiz v. Lackner, No. 254434 (Sacramento, Cal. Super. Ct., filed May 5,
1975). On September 3, 1976, a judgment was entered requiring major revisions in
the conduct of contract renewal hearings. The department was barred from relying
on evidence not presented at the renewal hearing, was required to conduct hearings
as quasi-judicial procedures subject to review under CAL. CODE CI. PROC. § 1094.5
(West 1955), as amended (West Supp. 1976). Hearings would now provide for cross-
examination of department representatives, and for public access to department records
relating to the plan prior to the contract renewal hearing.
424. S.F. Chronicle, June 6, 1975, at 27, col. 6.
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til 4 A.M. the following morning amidst claims of intimidation of ad-
verse witnesses by plan representatives.425
On June 9, 1975, the Prepaid Health Plan Advisory Committee,
appointed by Governor Brown, issued a progress report.42 6 The report
recommended that the PHP program be continued only if measures
were taken to stabilize enrollment and improve department super-
vision. 2 7 The committee advised that, except in medically underser-
ved areas, only two types of plans be allowed PHP contracts-the foun-
dation model and the multi-specialty prepaid group practice.42 The
committee also recommended that all plans be required to conform to
federal health maintenance organization standards.429 In light of the
failure of most plans to enroll a substantial non-Medi-Cal population,
425. Almost a year later the Sacramento Union also reported that threats had
been made by plan representatives. Sacramento Union, May 30, 1976, at Al. The
report also noted that the state had treated the American Health Care Plan "gently"
despite documentation of widespread misrepresentation by the plan. Id.
426. Prepaid Health Plan Advisory Committee, Progress Report, June 9, 1975 (on
file at San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation) [hereinafter cited as
Progress Report].
427. Id., Summary, Findings and Recommendations, at 1.
428. Id. If adopted, this recommendation would eliminate the most common type
of plan, the so-called brokerage plan in which the contractor subcontracts for the provi-
sion of medical services to enrollees. In that setting the contractor acts simply as
a fiscal intermediary or insurer. The committee noted that brokerage plans had "clearly
shown their inability to meet reasonable performance standards." Id. at 2.
429. Id. These standards are contained in the Health Maintenance Organization
Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, 42 U.S.C. § 300e (Supp. V, 1975). For a discussion
of the relationship of this act to the health needs of indigents, see Schneider & Stem,
Health Maintenance Organizations and the Poor. Problems and Prospects, 70 Nw. U.L.
REV. 90 (1975).
These standards were modified by the Health Maintenance Organization Amend-
ments of 1976, an act which enjoyed the support of an active lobbying effort by the
health insurance industry. Pub. L. No. 94-460; see HMO Bill Signed by Ford, TIE
NATIONAL UNDERWRITER: LIFE AND HEALTH INsURANcE EDrnON, Oct. 16, 1976.
The 1976 amendments weakened the original health maintenance organization
standards in several important respects. The 1973 legislation, for instance, required
health maintenance organizations to have a thirty day "open enrollment" period each
year during which they would accept individuals in the order in which they applied.
Act of Dec. 29, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, § 2, 87 Stat. 914. This provision allowed
for the enrollment of high-risk persons who might otherwise have had difficulty in
obtaining health care on a prepaid basis. Under the 1976 amendments, these open
enrollment requirements were considerably weakened. In addition, the 1973 legislation
provided that health maintenance organizations must fix capitation rates on the basis
of community rating-that is, rates must be uniform within the community, rather
than variable according to the projected health care needs of the enrollee. This pro-
vision, which allowed high-risk individuals to purchase prepaid health care at a price
which was not prohibitive, was also weakened by the 1976 amendments. For discussion
of these and other modifications of the standards, see 122 CONG. Rc. H9780, H9785
(daily ed. Sept. 13, 1976).
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the committee recommended mandating that all plans be composed of
at least 50 percent non-Medi-Cal beneficiaries by the end of the second
year of operation. This requirement could only be waived by the de-
partment under specific standards. 430  In order to ensure a greater con-
sumer voice in the operation of the plans, the committee recommended
requiring that one-third of each PHP's policymaking board be plan en-
rollees.4"' Plans would also be prohibited from using hospitals not ap-
proved by the California Medical Association Medical Staff Survey.432
The report recommended an end to the department policy of
"minimal regulation," and urged the department to encourage the crea-
tion of plans owned and operated by counties, communities, and con-
sumers. 433  The report also suggested development of new cost and
quality monitoring mechanisms which would provide an economic in-
centive for plans to actually practice preventive medicine.43 4  Interest-
ingly, these recommendations were approved by a committee which in-
cluded prepaid health plan administrators as well as Medi-Cal recipi-
ents and health professionals.
On June 26, 1975, the secretary of the Health and Welfare Agency,
Mario Obledo, announced the "termination" of the PHP program.
PHPs were to be replaced by Institutes for Medical Service (IMS)."as
Secretary Obledo stressed the importance of this new program:
Medi-Cal costs have soared while service has declined. In the last
eight years, Medi-Cal costs have risen more than two-fold. The
Institutes, which will receive at least 10% less than is paid to physi-
cians under fee-for-service, may assist in controlling costs, and are
specifically designed to guarantee an adequate level of care.
4 36
If the rhetoric was familiar, several of the specific proposals were
not.
4 3 7
430. Progress Report, supra note 426, Summary, Findings and Recommendations,
at 1. This proposal was already contained in the regulations proposed by HEW. See
text accompanying notes 323-28 supra. The performance of most plans in this area was
dismal. The overwhelming majority of PHPs had little or no non-Medi-Cal enrollment.
1973 Quality of Care Hearings, supra note 296, Appendix C.
431. Progress Report, supra note 426, Summary, Findings and Recommendations,
at 1. These enrollees could be from both the private and Medi-Cal populations enrolled
in the plan.
432. Id. For a discussion of the nature of the CMA Medical Staff Survey, see
Jackson Committee Hearings, supra note 163, at 144-98 (testimony of Dr. Bert Halter
& Dr. Robert Schlens).
433. Progress Report, supra note 426, Summary, Findings and Recommendations,
at 2.
434. Id.
435. Health and Welfare Agency Press Release, June 26, 1975. As will be seen,
the basic PHP structure remained intact under the new IMS proposal.
436. Id.
437. Secretary Obledo's announcement had been delivered in remarkably similar
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Nine points, drawn from the PHP Advisory Committee recom-
mendations, were outlined as the cornerstones of the IMS program.
Boards of directors of institutes were to include at least one-third plan
enrollees. 438  Preventive medicine was to be a mandatory component
in every institute and incentives were to be included to encourage such
care.43 9  Emergency care was to be assured through requirements of
on-duty, available physicians around the clock.440  Administrative costs
were to be limited to 12 percent of revenues for ongoing plans and 25
percent for beginning plans.44' Medical audits by department teams
would be conducted every six months and would place greater emphasis
on outcome-oriented measures and verification of data reported by
the institutes.
442
Conflict of interest provisions were to be strengthened and en-
forced.443  "Only stable, multi-specialty group practices or community-
wide foundations for medical care" were to be permitted to contract
with the state.444  Pilot projects were to be conducted to determine
methods of assuring stable enrollments in plans. 445  By the third con-
tract year, institutes were to be encouraged to have membership mixes
of not more than 50 percent Medi-Cal beneficiaries.446
Originally, the Brown administration had decided to implement
the IMS program without public hearings or the promulgation of reg-
ulations.447  After lengthy meetings with consumer representatives,
however, the department was finally convinced that the IMS program
could not be legally implemented in such -a fashion,448 and it therefore
language three years earlier by Governor Reagan in his message to the legislature.
See text accompanying note 144 supra.
Most of these points were explained and developed in a document accompanying
the press release. Division of Alternative Health Systems, Dep't of Health, California
Health & Welfare Agency, Institutes for Medical Services, June 26, 1975 (on file at
San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation).
438. Health and Welfare Agency Press Release, June 26, 1975, at 1.
439. Id.
440. Id. at 2. This requirement already existed, but would now be assured, accord-
ing to the press release, through vigilant enforcement by the department.
441. Id.
442. Id. at 3.
443. Id.
444. Id. at 4.
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. California Dep't of Health, Prepaid Health Plan Letter No. 48, June 27,
1975.
448. Internal Memorandum from Pat Butler to the San Francisco Neighborhood
Legal Assistance Foundation Staff, Aug. 12, 1975 (on file at San Francisco Neighbor-
hood Legal Assistance Foundation).
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agreed to promulgate regulations on an emergency basis. 440 Signifi-
cantly, the department was later forced to reject even this compromise
and to agree to promulgate regulations through the regular hearing pro-
cess.45 This final capitulation was the product of industry pressure,
spearheaded by the Health Maintenance Organization Association of
America, a trade association of PHP administrators.451
In the meantime, several pieces of relevant legislation were en-
acted. On September 22, 1975, the Knox-Keene Health Care Service
Plan Act of 1975 was signed into law.452 This act delegated the re-
sponsibility for the regulation of health care service plans, including
PHPs,45 3 to the commissioner of corporations.4 54  PHPs were therefore
required to comply with the provisions of both the Knox-Keene Act,
supervised by the commissioner of corporations, and with the provisions
of the Waxman-Duffy Act, supervised by the director of the Depart-
ment of Health.4" Plans were required to register with the commis-
449. Id.
450. California Dep't of Health, Prepaid Health Plan Letter No. 50, Nov. 31,
1975.
451. Telephone interview with Lloyd Hinkleman, former counsel for the Health
Maintenance Organization Association of America, Nov. 16, 1976.
452. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE §§ 1340-99.5 (West Supp. 1976). The act repealed
the Knox-Mills Health Plan Act, Cal. Stat. 1965, ch. 880, § 1, at 2482.
453. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 1343(a) (West Supp. 1976).
454. Id. § 1341. Under the Knox-Mills Health Plan Act, health care service
plans were required to register with the California Attorney General, and to meet
specified tangible net equity requirements. Those requirements were later made appli-
cable to PHPs. Id., § 14450(c).
455. On April 8, 1976, in a desire to avoid duplication of functions, the Health
and Welfare Agency and the Business and Transportation Agency entered into an ar-
rangement which placed final responsibility for the performance of most functions with
the commissioner of corporations. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Depart-
ment of Health and the Department of Corporations, Apr. 8, 1976 (on file at San
Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation). This arrangement was chal-
lenged in Walker v. Obledo, No. 261828 (Sacramento, Cal. Super. Ct., filed June 30,
1976). The consumer plaintiffs alleged that the memorandum of understanding violated
the Waxman-Duffy Prepaid Health Plan Act since nothing in the Knox-Keene Act
altered the responsibilities of the Department of Health established by the prior statute.
The plaintiffs also claimed that the joint responsibilities for supervision of the PHP
program established by the memorandum of understanding violated the requirement
of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5) (Supp. V, 1975) that a single agency be charged with
the supervision of a state's Medicaid program. The Department of Health had been
designated as the single state agency for the Medi-Cal program in California. CAL.
WELF. & INSTNS CODE § 10600 (West Supp. 1976).
Subsequent to the filing of the lawsuit, the acting director of PHPs within the
Department of Health testified that nothing in the memorandum would alter the de-
partment's responsibilities under the Waxman-Duffy Act. Deposition of Victor R. Bois-
seree, Walker v. Obledo, supra. The problem of joint administration had existed under
the Knox-Mills Act as well. See STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON MEDICAL EDUCATION
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sioner of corporations and to meet specified financial and informational
requirements. 5 6 Enrollment solicitors for plans were also required to
register, and were prohibited from using or permitting the use of any
advertising or method of solicitation which was untrue or misleading.457
General standards were also established for the medical services to be
provided by plans to enrollees.458 Regulations to carry out these regis-
tration functions were filed with the secretary of state on June 1,
1976.459
On September 30, 1975, S.B. 385 was signed into law.460  This
measure widened departmental and public access to information re-
garding PIP subcontractors and financial records.
In November 1975, Steven Passin was removed as manager of the
Alternative Health Systems Division.461  Thomas G. Moore, Jr., for-
merly executive secretary to the PUP Advisory Committee, was named
to take his place on an acting basis.
On November 19 and 20, 1975, the Department of Health con-
ducted public hearings in Los Angeles on proposed regulations to im-
plement the IMS program.4 62 On November 24, a hearing was con-
ducted in San Francisco. A week later a final hearing was conducted
in Fresno. No IMS regulations have yet been promulgated as a result
of those hearings.
463
On January 19, 1976, the Los Angeles Times reported that the
Brown administration's first attempt at a major governmental reform,
the IMS program, had "quietly fallen on its face. '464  The Times noted
that these proposed health plan reforms had never been implemented
because of opposition by plan representatives and threats of litiga-
tion.465
AND HUMANr NEEDS, SENATE CoMM. OF HEALTH & WELFARE, 1974 Reg. Sess., GRoup
HEALTH PLANS xN CALiFo N , WHo REGuLATES.
456. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE §§ 1349-56 (West Supp. 1976).
457. Id., §§ 1357-66.
458. Id. §§ 1367-73. Many of these standards reiterated requirements of the
Waxman-Duffy Act. Compare id. § 1367(e), with CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §
14450(h) (West Supp. 1976).
459. CAr.. ADmi. REG. 76, No. 23 (June 1, 1976), adopting 10 CAL. ADMIN.
CODE §§ 1300.43-.99 (1976).
460. CAL. WELF. & INS''Ns CODEH §§ 14452, 14456, 14459 (West Supp. 1976).
461. Telephone conversation with Steven Passin, Oct. 12, 1976.
462. California Dep't of Health, Health and Welfare Agency, Notice of Proposed
Changes in the Regulations of the State Department of Health, Oct. 22, 1975, at 5-6.
463. The attempts by the Brown administration to implement the IMS program
were scrutinized by the California legislature during hearings conducted on November
21, 1975, by the Assembly Committee on Health.
464. L.A. Times, Jan. 19, 1976, § 2, at 1, col. 4.
465. As other commentators noted, "[not even the name change took. No one,
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In April, six months after his appointment as acting manager of
the Division of Alternative Health Systems, Thomas Moore was dis-
charged.466 In announcing the firing, Jerome Lackner, director of the
Department of Health, explained that Moore was imposing excessively
rigid and uncompromising standards on the PHP program,467 noting in
particular that the number of PHP contracts had been reduced from
fifty-four to thirty in less than six months.468  A few days later Moore
responded to his ouster by charging that he had been fired for trying
to end favoritism and profiteering in the PHP program.460
The PHP program received national attention on April 17, 1976,
when the ABC television network aired an hour-long news close-up
Medicine and Money.470  Included in this special report was a segment
on several Southern California plans, including the DePaulo Health
Plan and the Central Los Angeles Health Project.171  Enrollees of the
two health plans were interviewed regarding their desperate attempts
to obtain emergency care from plan physicians. In one case, a patient's
family had tried for four days to secure emergency hospitalization; the
patient died soon after finally being admitted.472
The president of a "trade association" of PHPs described medicine
as "inherently a profitable business. '"47h In response, Thomas Moore,
the reform-minded health department official who had been fired in
the interim between the filming and airing of the television report, said
that the PHP program had attracted "organizations motivated by the
opportunity to take off the top," managed by people "who had never
been in prepaid medical care before, but who could do a little figuring
with a pencil and a piece of paper. 47 4  Moore also described the in-
creased surveillance that would have to be imposed "in the wake of
this bad experience.
'475
outside the Department of Health, ever took seriously to calling PHPs institutes for
medical service." Lewis & Berthelson, Prepaid Health Plans Have History of Woe,
Sacramento Bee, May 2, 1976, at A3, col. 1. See notes 447-51 & accompanying text
supra.
466. L.A. Times, Apr. 14, 1976, § 1, at 3, col. 1.
467. Id.
468. Id. at 27, col. 2.
469. L.A. Times, Apr. 19, 1976, § 1, at 3, col. 4.
470. ABC Television Network, ABC News Closeup: Medicine and Money, Apr.
17, 1976 (transcript on file at San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance Founda-
tion).
471. Id. at 27-40.
472. Id. at 32-38.
473. Id. at 30.
474. ld.
475. Id. at 40.
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On April 19, 1976, the Department of Health issued administra-
tive subpoenas to open up the books of subcontractors of the Omni-
Rx Health Care Plan, after the plan had refused to allow departmental
auditors to review financial records.17 6 A Sacramento Bee article re-
porting on the subpoenas noted links between the Omni-Rx plan and
political officials in Sacramento and Washington, D.C., through the state
Democratic party chairman and through the husband of U.S. Repre-
sentative Yvonne Braithwaite Burke, a Democrat from Los Angeles. 7
On May 19, 1976, it was further disclosed that Omni-Rx had refused
to allow state auditors access to the financial records of the affiliated
companies that provided services through subcontracts with the plan.1
78
On May 28, 1976, the Sacramento Foundation Community
Health Plan announced that it was terminating its PHP contract with
the state.4 79 The president of the Foundation criticized the Brown ad-
ministration for using the poor as "political pawns" and for failing to
honor commitments to the Foundation.
480
On July 8 and 9, 1976, the California Assembly Subcommittee on
Health Care Investigations conducted hearings on the Omni-Rx Health
Care Plan. The subcommittee investigated charges that Omni-Rx had
misused public funds, failed to provide quality care, and made pay-
ments from Medi-Cal monies to the spouse of a congresswoman to
lobby for federal funds. Also explored were allegations that the De-
partment of Health had failed to adequately review the operations of
Omni-Rx, and had concealed major shortcomings of the health plan.48 1
The following week, Governor Brown announced that he would
conduct a personal inspection of the Health Department.48 2 This exam-
ination would focus on claims of departmental incompetence in investi-
gating the possible misuse of public funds by the Omni-Rx Health Care
Plan.4
8 3
On August 2, 1976, a letter was sent by the members of the Spe-
cial Assembly Subcommittee on Health Care Investigations to Governor
Brown setting forth the preliminary findings of the subcommittee and
476. Sacramento Bee, Apr. 20, 1976, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
477. Id. at 1, col. 3.
478. Sacramento Bee, May 19, 1976, § 1, at 16, col. 6.
479. Sacramento Bee, May 29, 1976, § 2, at 5, col. 5.
480. Id.
481. Preliminary Hearings on Prepaid Health Plan Abuses Before the Special As-
sembly Subcomm. on Health Care Investigations (1976). See text accompanying note
477 supra.
482. S.F. Examiner, July 14, 1976, at 2, col. 5.
483. Id.
January 1977]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
recommending several changes in PHP administration.1 4  The letter
criticized the quality of care within the Omni-Rx Health Care Plan on
several counts including findings that the plan had employed question-
able providers, 485 had seriously underprovided dental services, 4 6 and
had numerous deficiencies in its pharmacy services.
487
The subcommittee criticized the financial and corporate structure
of Omni-Rx: "The relationships between these individuals and com-
panies are so entangled that they obstruct public scrutiny and confuse
efforts to trace the passage of public funds from one entity to an-
other. ' 48 8  The letter also pointed out that Omni-Rx had been allowed
to continue its state PHP contract despite the fact that it had not met
tangible net equity requirements of state law. 489  The letter recom-
mended immediate termination of the Omni-Rx contract, prohibition
of similar types of brokerage plans,490 broader reporting responsibilities
as to the flow of health care dollars, and stricter standards for plans.49'
Probably the strongest criticism, however, was reserved for the
Department of Health. The subcommittee noted that from the begin-
ning of the PHP program, there had been two main weaknesses: the
state's inability to trace taxpayers' funds to insure that they were act-
ually being used for health care, and its failure to monitor the quality
484. Letter from Assemblymen Barry Keene, Bob McLennan, and Herschel Rosen-
thal, to Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Aug. 2, 1976 [hereinafter cited as Keene Let-
ter].
485. One of the providers, a podiatrist, had previously billed the Medi-Cal program
for services rendered to two dead men. This same provider had been involved in
at least forty-five malpractice cases in Los Angeles, and had been denied institutional
privileges at numerous California hospitals. The subcommittee criticized the use of
this podiatrist and another provider used by the plan, in the strongest language: 'This
cursory review disclosed two providers whose professional histories were so clouded
that it strains the limits of imagination to understand their continued presence anywhere
in the medical field. That they were permitted to act under the seal of state govern-
ment approval is astounding." Id. at 2.
486. Id. at 3-4. The four most recent medical audits had revealed the same defi-
ciencies in the plan's dental program. The most recent audit recommended the termina-
tion of dental services within the plan for Medi-Cal recipients. Id.
487. Id. at 4.
488. Id. at 5.
489. Id. at 6.
490. See note 428 & accompanying text supra. On September 1, 1976, in a com-
plaint filed in the U.S. District Court in Los Angeles, the Securities and Exchange
Commission charged Omni-Rx Health Systems with issuing false financial statements,
manipulating stock, and misusing $670,000 from a public stock offering. L.A. Times,
Sept. 2, 1976, at 9. Assemblyman Keene commented that the SEC complaint "unbur-
dens us of the charge that we were picking on Omni-Rx." S.F. Examiner, Sept. 2,
1976, at 7, col. 1 (city ed.).
491. Keene Letter, supra note 484, at 9-10.
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of care provided by PHPs.492 The letter then pointed out that "[s]ome
civil service holdovers from the previous administration continue guid-
ing the prepaid health program with the attitude that their primary pur-
pose is to promote these plans, rather than to regulate the quality of
their performance."493
The subcommittee recommended the termination of several staff
members and the reprimanding of others "[u]nless their behavior can
be justified by them in the course of continued legislative inquiry.
'494
The members also urged commendations for the PHP investigators who
had attempted to uncover violations by the Omni-Rx plan despite "foot-
dragging and outright hostility by their superiors."49 5
On August 9, 1976, Governor Brown ordered the commissioner
of corporations to investigate all prepaid health plans and to terminate
contracts with all plans that did not meet tangible net equity require-
ments.496
The Brown administration received further reprimands regarding
the PHP program on October 5, 1976, when the undersecretary of
HEW sent a warning letter to the Governor.497 The letter pointed out
that the standard Medi-Cal contract was out of compliance with federal
regulations, 98 that the state had failed to secure precontract approval
from HEW for expenditures exceeding $100,000 as required by federal
regulations, 99 and that the efforts of the State Department of Health
to monitor the PHP program "[left] much to be desired."'5 00
Citing the state's "continued failure . . . to correct the serious
deficiencies of the PHP program,"501 the HEW undersecretary ordered
Governor Brown to correct these deficiencies by February 15, 1977,
in order to insure California's continued receipt of federal Medicaid
matching funds. 502
492. Id. at 11.
493. Id.
494. Id. at 16.
495. Id.
496. S.F. Examiner, Aug. 10, 1976, at 28, col. 1.
497. Letter from Marjorie Lynch, undersecretary of the U.S. Dep't of Health,
Education, and Welfare, to Edmund G. Brown, Jr., governor of California, Oct. 5,
1976 (on file at San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation).
498. 45 C.F.R. § 249.82 (1975).
499. Id. § 249.82(d) (2) (i).
500. Letter from Marjorie Lynch, undersecretary of the U.S. Dep't of Health,
Education, and Welfare, to Edmund G. Brown, Jr., governor of California, Oct. 5,
1976, at 1 (on file at San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation).
501. Id. at 2.
502. Id. at 1-3.
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Conclusion
As of August 1, 1976, only 192,972 Medi-Cal recipients were en-
rolled in twenty-seven PHPs in California. 1°3 This figure represents
a substantial drop from the 254,363 Medi-Cal recipients enrolled in
fifty-three plans as of May 1, 1974.504 It is clear that rapid expansion
of PHPs has been not only halted, but reversed.
While the PHP program in California is waning, several other
states are experimenting with prepayment projects under Medicaid.
As of September 1976, thirteen states besides California had contracted
with a total of twenty prepaid group practices to provide health services
to Medicaid recipients. 50 5 As in California, however, problems have
arisen with several of these plans.
On July 21, 1976, the Illinois state welfare director informed the
Cure Health Plan that its contract with the state was being terminated
because of fiscal mismanagement and inadequate medical care."0 '
Among the complaints leveled against the Cure Health Plan were in-
adequate facilities for provision of simple laboratory tests, inadequate
staffing of physicians, inability to obtain specialty referrals, inadequate
transportation of patients, and a general breakdown of morale among
Cure physicians.50 7 The state reported that although Cure was a non-
profit entity, much of the money it received was paid into five affiliated
profit-making companies. The lessons from California apparently had
not been lost on Cure administrators.
We are, therefore, at a crucial time in the development of health
care services for indigents. Many states, concerned about rising costs
of health care, have initiated drastic cutbacks in the scope of their
Medicaid programs.5 08 Other states, apparently more impressed by the
theory of the PHP program than by its track record, have begun explor-
ing the delivery of health services through mechanisms other than the
fee-for-service system.
503. CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF HEALTH, PHP CONTRACTS 3 (effective Aug. 1, 1976).
504. CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF HEALTH, PHP CONTRACTS 5 (effective May 1, 1974).
505. Telephone interview with Homer R. Jolley, special assistant to the commis-
sioner of the Medical Services Administration of the Social and Rehabilitation Service
of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Sept. 17, 1976.
506. Health Services Information Bulletin, Health Care Publications, July 26, 1976,
at 5.
507. Id.
508. See Mullen & Fredenburg, Coping with Medicaid Cutbacks, 9 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 392 (1975). See also L. MULLEN & A. SCHNEIDER, MEDICAID CUTBACKS: A HAND-
aOOK FOR BENEFICIARY ADVOCATES, (1976) (available from the National Clearinghouse
for Legal Services, No. 18,090).
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As has been shown, each potential weakndss in the concept and
implementation of the PHP program has created major institutional
problems. The program has been plagued by enrollment and billing
fraud, poor quality care, and bureaucratic inertia. Before suggesting
measures to save the program, however, it must first be determined
whether it is worth saving.
Since the inception of the PHP program, the underlying assump-
tions of the program have gone unquestioned. Even the program's
most severe critics have generally agreed that the concept of prepaid
medicine is a good one, and that the problems arose in translating that
concept into practice.509 Supporters have contended that Pi-Ps could,
if properly administered, alter the delivery of health services so that
patients would become reoriented from crisis medicine to preventive
care. Plans could thereby meet costs at less than fee-for-service rates
by substituting relatively inexpensive programs such as health educa-
tion for more expensive medical procedures.
These assumptions, however, are now being subjected to critical
analysis.51 0 The greater reported use of preventive services within many
health maintenance organizations than within control groups of fee-for-
service patients may actually be the result of a self-fulfilling process
whereby individuals oriented toward preventive medicine tend to enroll
in health maintenance organizations.51' The economies achieved by
509. See, e.g., Jackson Committee Hearings, supra note 163, at 52 (statement of
Dr. Lester Breslow).
510. For an examination of the assumptions of the prepaid group practice model,
see D. MECHANIC, THE GROWTH OF BuREAucAnc MFnIcam 83-98 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as MECHANic]. Mechanic points out, for instance, that most of what we know
regarding the prepaid group practice mode comes from large prototypes such as Kaiser-
Permanente, and that these data have probably given a more favorable picture of the
generic prepaid group practice "than reality warrants." Id. at 84-85.
For a review of studies regarding the performance of prepaid group practices,
see Donabedian, An Evaluation of Prepaid Group Practice, 6 INQUIRY 3 (Sept. 1969);
Roemer & Shonick, HMO Performance: The Recent Evidence, 51 MLBnANK MEM.
FuN Q. 271 (1973).
511. For a discussion of factors involved in patient selection of prepaid group
practice versus fee-for-service, see MEcHANIc, supra note 510, at 119-58. Mechanic
reviews the existing studies and finds that it is still unclear whether there are sys-
tematic differences regarding health attitudes and practices between the people who
select prepaid group practice and those who elect to receive care under the fee-for-
service mode.
In order properly to test the true effects of the health maintenance organization
method of health care delivery on the health status of patients, the patients need to
be randomly assigned to health maintenance organization and fee-for-service modes.
Such a study is currently being conducted by the Rand Corporation under a grant
from HEW. The Rand study is discussed in a symposium in 11 INQumy 3-60 (1974).
(INQumY is published by the Blue Cross Association.)
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many health maintenance organizations may in part be the result of the
use of outside medical care by many plan enrollees. 51 2  The low hos-
pital utilization rates reported in many studies of prepaid group prac-
tices" 3 may also be more a byproduct of a lack of available hospital
beds than a result of altered treatment patterns within the plan.5
14
Whatever the validity of the prepaid group practice concept gen-
erally, the application of this concept to a poverty population in Cali-
fornia pointed up tremendous shortcomings in the existing models.
The economic incentive to undertreat, for example, is inherent in any
prepaid program. The temptation may be counteracted by several
other factors: for instance, the medical provider's ethical code, the
threat of malpractice lawsuits, and the costly complications which could
arise if potentially serious medical conditions are not treated.515
Those constraints, however, probably provide more protection for
the middle class patient than for the disadvantaged Medi-Cal recipient.
The low-income patient may have neither the sophistication nor means
to pursue a malpractice claim. Moreover, the cost of delayed treat-
ment may not have to be borne by the plan, since the patient may be
disenrolled or no longer a Medi-Cal recipient by the time treatment
is necessary.
The threat of undertreatment and the relative inability of indi-
512. Among patients of the Kaiser plan in Portland, approximately 10% had used
some nonplan services during the preceding year. Greenlick, The Impact of Prepaid
Group Practice on American Medical Care: A Critical Evaluation, 399 ANNALS OF
THE AM. ACADEMY OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 100 (1972). A "significant portion" of these
services, however, had been reimbursed by the Kaiser system, and thus were included
in Kaiser's costs. Id. at 112. Another of the health maintenance organization studies
found in one case that 12% of all ambulatory patient contacts during one year occurred
with nonplan physicians. In addition, 7.2% of plan members' hospital admissions were
to nonplan hospitals. The researchers did not note how many of these outside services
were paid for by the plans. M. ROEMER, R. HETHERINGTON, C. HOPKINS, A. GERST,
E. PARSONS, & D. LONG, HEALTH INSURANCE EFFECTS: SERVICES, EXPENDrrURES, AND
ATTITUDES UNDER THREE TYPES OF PLANS (1973).
California's experience has been consistent with the results of the Roemer study.
In Los Angeles, for example, many PHP enrollees unwilling or unable to secure serv-
ices through their plans received services through county facilities. See note 337 supra.
513. See, e.g., Donabedian, An Evaluation of Prepaid Group Practice, 6 INQUIRY
3, 13 (1969); Roemer & Shonick, HMO Performance: The Recent Evidence, 51 MIL-
BANK MEM. FUND Q. 271, 281-88 (1973).
514. For a discussion of the effect of hospital bed availability on hospital utilization
see Roemer & Schonick, HMO Performance: The Recent Evidence, 51 MILBANK MEM.
FUND Q. 271, 281-88 (1973). After reviewing a number of research reports, Roemer
and Shonick concluded that bed supply is "an important explanatory variable" affecting
hospital utilization. Id. at 283.
515. R. AUGER & V. GOLDBERG, PREPAID HEALTH PLANS AND MORAL HAZARD 45
(1973),
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gents to protect their rights under a PIP contract have been underscored
by the actual experience of Medi-Cal recipients enrolled in prepaid
health plans. Thus, if the California experience is evaluated on an ab-
solute scale, the program is probably not worth saving. The PHP pro-
gram, however, does not exist in a vacuum, and must be compared
to the delivery of health services under the fee-for-service model.
In September 1974, a report was issued by the General Research
Corporation of Santa Barbara, California51 comparing quality of care
under the fee-for-service and prepaid systems. These researchers in-
vestigated five Southern California PHPs. By means of process audits
of medical records, the care provided by these five health plans was
compared to the care given by a sample of fee-for-service Medi-Cal
providers in the same locale. The quality scores of both the PHP and
fee-for-service physicians were found to be "disappointingly low. '517
On the average, the quality of PHP care differed little from that of the
fee-for-service practices. 518
The fee-for-service and prepaid models have not only both pro-
vided poor health service, but have shared other problems as well. Re-
cent reports have documented fiscal mismanagement and provider
fraud in the Medicaid program generally.51 9 In many areas, fee-for-
service providers have been unwilling to provide services to recipients
under the Medicaid program.52 It is because the alternative of fee-
for-service medicine is so inadequate, that we recommend radical re-
structuring of the P-P program rather than its termination. But having
516. D. Louis & J. McCord, Evaluation of California's Prepaid Health Plans
(PHPs) (1974) (General Research Corporation Report, Submitted to the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare) [hereinafter cited as General Research Report].
517. Id. at 4.
518. Id. at 3. It should be noted, however, that there were wide differences among
the plans. Several tended to score significantly higher than fee-for-service providers
on the various quality measures. Other tended to score significantly lower on these
same measures. Id. at 32-50.
519. See, e.g., ABC Television Network, ABC News Closeup: Medicine and
Money, Apr. 17, 1976 (transcript on file at San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assist-
ance Foundation); STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON LoNG TERM CARE OF SENATE COMM. ON
AGING, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., FRAuD AND ABUSE AMONG PRACTrIONERS PARTICIPATING
IN THE MEDICAID PROGRAM (1976).
520. See JOINT LFGsLATIVE AuDrr COMMITTEE, REPORT OF TM OFFICE OF THE
AUDITOR GENERAL ON PROVIDER PARTICIPATION IN THE MEDI-CAL FEE-FOR-SERVICE PRO-
GRAM, DOC. No. 254, 1975 Reg. Sess.; A Survey of Physician Participation in the
Medi-Cal Program, 15 SOCIOECONOMIC REPORT 1 (1975). The inability of many Medi-
Cal recipients to obtain medical services is also the subject of a lawsuit pending against
the director of the Department of Health in an attempt to raise payment levels to
providers. Disabled and Blind Action Committee of California v. Mayer, No. 679-
858 (San Francisco, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Apr. 29, 1975).
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recognized that the program should be saved, we must also recognize
that it is still at a pilot project stage. PHPs will not, in the near future,
be the answer to rising costs in the Medi-Cal program. 521  They may
never be. Moreover, PHPs have not been and may never be the
answer to providing mainstream medicine to the poor.
522
Numerous measures have been recommended to improve the PHP
program and many have been adopted. Unfortunately, most of these
measures implicitly depend upon vigorous regulation of the PHPs by
the Department of Health. Had the department displayed that vigor,
reforms such as the initial Waxman-Duffy legislation5 23 might well have
521. In the recent past, PHPs have probably contributed to the increase in costs
in the program. As discussed earlier, some received capitation payments in excess
of the fee-for-service costs for providing similar services. See text accompanying note
335 supra. In addition, PHPs were supposed to reduce the high administrative costs
incurred by the state in the fee-for-service system. Administrative costs within the
plans have been extremely high. See April 1974 AUDITOR GENERAL REPORT, supra note
238. Thus, the PHP program has often merely shifted administrative costs from one
entity to another, and perhaps actually increased those costs in the process.
Moreover, although costs were supposed to be reduced by insuring that capitation
rates were at least 10% less than fee-for-service averages, this goal may have been
realized through selective enrollment by the PHPs. Assume, for example, that the
fee-for-service AFDC average monthly cost for medical care was thirty dollars. This
cost would contemplate some recipients utilizing services at the rate of twenty dollars
per month and others utilizing services at the rate of forty dollars per month. The
average of such utilizations costs would be thirty dollars per month. The PHP would
receive twenty-seven dollars per month for each AFDC recipient enrolled ($30 - (10%
x $30) = $27). If the plan practiced selective enrollment, as many reports indicated,
and only enrolled relatively healthy AFDC recipients with utilization rates of twenty dol-
lars per month, costs to the state would actually have increased. The state would now
be paying twenty-seven dollars per month to the PHP whereas it had been paying only
twenty dollars per month to the fee-for-service providers for that same patient. The
plan could deliver exactly the same level of care provided under the fee-for-service
system and realize seven dollars per month as profit.
522. One of the goals of the Medi-Cal program which was to be advanced by
the PHP program was that poor people would receive care in the same maner as
wealthier individuals. As discussed earlier, few PHPs had any significant non-Medi-
Cal enrollment. As a result, mainstream medicine as a goal was better realized in
the fee-for-service model. As Assemblywoman Leona Egeland pointed out: "I have
sat at least for this past year on the Health Committee in the Assembly and listened
to all sorts of bills relating to mainstream medicine. I would define mainstream medi-
cine as medical care with profit for someone. I'm not sure that that's the goal that
we should continue to look at." Oversight Hearing on Medi-Cal Before the Senate
Comm. on Health and Welfare, 1976 Reg. Sess. 15. Whatever the merits of the goal
of mainstream medicine, nearly all observers agree that it has not been realized within
the PHP program.
523. Cal. Stat. 1972, ch. 1366, at 2718, as amended, CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE
§§ 14118-481 (West Supp. 1976). The initial legislation, for example, prohibited en-
rollment misrepresentations. Id. The Department of Health documented numerous
such violations against many plans. Despite that fact, no plan contracts were terminated
for such violations.
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been adequate to correct abuses within the PHP program. The De-
partment of Health, however, has proven inadequate to the task.
It is unlikely for both fiscal and political reasons that the depart-
ment will ever have adequate investigative staff to police the program
closely. The enforcement problem is compounded by the failure of
officials to follow up on the discoveries and recommendations of their
investigators. It is therefore necessary that new standards and proce-
dures be developed which will function within a less than aggressive
bureaucracy.
524
Increased Record Keeping and Reporting
The state health department's audits have proven inadequate for
monitoring plan operations. We therefore recommend increased re-
porting responsibilities for PHPs. The additional information required
would allow simplified analysis of the quality of medical care by the
Department of Health. Information could be required relating to both
process and outcomes measures.525
Plans should be compelled, for example, to report monthly the
number of adult women who have not received a documented pap test
within the past year. Data could be similarly required regarding the
non-occurrence of other screening procedures such as blood pressure
524. On October 8, 1976, President Ford signed into law legislation which provides,
in part, that Medicaid providers must meet federal health maintenance organization
standards in order to qualify for federal funding through capitation payments. Health
Maintenance Organization Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-460, § 202. See note
429 supra. The federal HMO requirement applies where the services under contract
include inpatient hospital service and any other Medicaid service, or any three other
Medicaid services. Id. The determination that a provider has satisfied the federal stand-
ards is made by the secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. Id. Certain pro-
viders, such as those receiving a specified level, of funding as migrant health centers,
are exempt from the HMO standards. Id. The new amendments also require that the
provider draw at least one-half of its enrollees from the private (non-Medicaid or Medi-
care) sector, although this requirement can be waived by the secretary of HEW for up to
three years if the provider demonstrates progress toward meeting the requirement. Id.
This new scheme contrasts sharply with California's present system, under which
PHP contracts have tended to go to newly formed plans with neither the financial base
nor the organizational structure necessary to provide quality care. Inevitably, money
which should be spent on providing health services to recipients is diverted to establish
the kind of structure necessary to appeal to enrollees. Both the state and the Medi-
Cal enrollees are shortchanged in the process. Thus, to the extent that the new federal
restrictions favor the established prepaid group practice with an already diverse patient
population, they will serve to greatly lessen financial and administrative problems within
the program. Moreover, the legislation has provided an additional level of scrutiny
of plan operators which may serve to weed out the "fly-by-night" operators. See note
530 infra.
525. See note 308 supra.
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readings. Through the requirement of such data reporting, plans
would be forced to establish centralized recordkeeping, to maintain
charts on all enrollees (not just those who present themselves for medi-
cal care), to formulate specific treatment criteria, and conduct outreach
among enrollees to ensure program utilization. Some discretion would
necessarily be vested in the Department of Health to promulgate regu-
lations regarding what would constitute acceptable utilization levels
within plans.
Plans should also be required to report data relating to such out-
comes measures as birth weight and incidence of hypertension. This
data could then be compared to data collected from other plans and
from control groups in the fee-for-service sector. Plans which were
actually practicing preventive medicine should have improved outcome
measures for these factors.
In light of the increased data reporting responsibilities there
may be a tendency for plans to overreport utilization in order to secure
favorable evaluations. On-site medical audits, during which utilization
data could be verified, should therefore be conducted.5 26  Periodic in-
terviews should also be conducted of plan enrollees to verify the accur-
acy of medical charts and utilization data, and to survey enrollee satis-
faction.
Removal of PHPs Power to Solicit Enrollees
As long as door-to-door solicitation is the sole or primary method
of securing new plan members, enrollment abuses will be the rule
rather than the exception. We therefore recommend that the initial
solicitation function be removed from the plans. Instead, county eligi-
bility workers could inform new Medi-Cal recipients during certifi-
cation of the fee-for-service and prepaid alternatives for health care
available locally. This procedure could be repeated during redetermina-
tions of eligibility for continuing recipients. The Medi-Cal recipient
could then elect to waive confidentiality and have his or her name
forwarded to any plans in the area. The plans could provide the reci-
pient with further information. PHPs should be prohibited from com-
pensating marketing representatives on a commission or partial com-
526. Process audits as presently performed appear to be used primarily as educa-
tional devices for plans. See text accompanying notes 412-15 supra. Despite the defi-
ciencies exposed by these audits, offending plans have been renewed again and again.
It should therefore be made clear at all levels of the Department of Health that audits




mission basis. Such a step would remove much of the incentive for
enrollment fraud. Moreover, since the plan would be contacting only
recipients who had expressed an interest in prepaid care, much of the
inefficiency of door-to-door solicitation would be avoided.
Enrollment Stabilization
The Department of Health should take steps to stabilize enroll-
ment within plans to insure continuity of care. As currently estab-
lished, enrollment in PHPs is limited to certain public assistance recipi-
ents.5 -7  Many recipients lose public assistance eligibility in a single
month for various technical reasons but are restored to eligibility the
following month. Eligibility for the plan, however, will have been ter-
minated in the interim. We therefore recommend that eligibility for
PHPs be expanded to include all Medi-Cal recipients. Interim eligi-
bility for recent Medi-Cal recipients could also be provided by the state
for limited periods.
The recent passage of the HIMO Amendments of 1976,528 which
require in effect that PHPs meet federal HMO standards if they are
to continue to receive Medicaid funding,52 9 may well result in the ter-
mination of many present PHP contracts. Such a result must surely
be applauded. But it would be unfortunate if the amendments had
the additional effect of relaxing the pressure on the state of California
to improve its own oversight capabilities. 30
527. Enrollment in PHPs has been limited to Medi-Cal recipients who are either
public assistance recipients or categorically related medically needy individuals. This
has been due to the lack of sufficient actuarial data to establish capitation rates for
medically indigent adults. As we have seen, however, capitation rates for public assist-
ance recipients have been questioned.
528. See notes 429 & 524 supra.
529. See note 4 & accompanying text supra.
530. Two recent developments have renewed hope that California will not abdicate
its own oversight responsibilities. On November 10, 1976, the Department of Health
announced that the State of California would not grant provisional HMO certification
to California PHPs. (Pursuant to Public Law 94-460 (see notes 429 & 524 supra), section
202, states were authorized to provisionally certify HMOs pending action by HEW on
applications for certification.) Although the announced basis for this decision was fiscal,
the decision will have the effect of terminating, at least temporarily, most PHP con-
tracts in early 1977. Cal. Dept. of Health, PHP Letter No. 60, Nov. 10, 1976; Cal.
Dept. of Health, Press Release, Nov. 10, 1976.
On December 15, 1976, a law suit was filed by the California Department of Cor-
porations against Omni-Rx Health Systems seeking to halt the sale of company stock
and to place the firm in receivership. In announcing the filing of this lawsuit, Governor
Brown, who had previously described Omni-Rx as "a pretzel palace of interlocking enti-
ties," declared that company directors had "not only defrauded the stockholders but also
channeled funds through intricate corporate entities to enrich themselves." San Fran-
January 1977]
760 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28
As Senator Henry Jackson declared in convening the United States
Senate hearings on PHPs, "We do not want other states to repeat Cali-
fornia's mistakes."5"1  It would be doubly tragic now for us to repeat
our own.
cisco Examiner, Dec. 15, 1976 (city ed.), p. 6, col. 3. This long overdue step by the
state was taken amidst mounting pressure by the federal government. See, e.g., text
accompanying notes 497-502 supra. On December 12, 1976, the General Accounting
Office had released a report reviewing the operations of five PHPs including Omni-Rx.
The report concluded that the "nonprofit" PHPs were actually fronts for profitmaking
companies. U.S. General Accounting Office, Relationships Between Nonprofit Prepaid
Health Plans with California Medicaid Contracts and For Profit Entities Affiliated with
Them (Nov. 1, 1976).
531. Jackson Committee Hearings, supra note 163, at 2.
